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Money in Politics: Judicial Roadblocks
to Campaign Finance Reform
By JOHN S. SHOCKLEY*
Introduction
The modem era of campaign finance reform has lasted more than
ten years, yet recent elections indicate that the issue is far from re-
solved.' With the familiar charges and counter-charges about the influ-
ence of money still ringing in our ears,2 it is appropriate to look back
upon the basic assumptions and particular circumstances from which
our current system of campaign finance laws evolved. Although ana-
lysts have commented voluminously on legislative and judicial at-
tempts to handle the multiple issues of money in politics,3 this article
will attempt to shed new light on specific aspects of the campaign fi-
nance reform struggle, in the belief both that some basic questions can
benefit from re-examination, and that the stakes are high enough to
* Professor of Political Science, Western Illinois University. B.A., University of
Texas, Austin, 1966; M.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1967; Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin, Madison, 1972. Many people were helpful in the course of doing this research.
The author would like to thank especially Dan Lowenstein, Professor of Law, UCLA, Mar-
lene Arnold Nicholson, Professor of Law, DePaul University, and Charles Helm, Professor
of Political Science, Western Illinois University, for comments on an earlier draft of this
article. The National Endowment for the Humanities and Western Illinois University were
helpful in providing research opportunities and a sabbatical, respectively. Without such
help this article would have been impossible to complete.
1. The first major campaign reform act of the modern era was passed in 1971. See H.
ALEXANDER, FINANCING PoLMCS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1980); the issue emerged slowly in the
1960's. For a review of the modern era and of the first era of campaign finance reform, see
H. ALEXANDER, supra, ch. 2; see also United States. v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957);
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2. The 1982 elections were the most expensive off-year elections in American history.
The Federal Election Commission reported that congressional candidates raised a total of
$356.7 million and spent $343.9 million. "These figures represent a 43-44% increase over
monies raised and spent in the 1980 Congressional elections, and an almost 80% increase
over 1978." Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Releases Data on 1981-82 Congressional Spending,
Press Release 1 (May 2, 1983). The total for all federal, state, and local offices has been
estimated at nearly one billion dollars. See Nesbit, Who Monitors Those Dirty Political
Ads?, In These Times, Nov. 17-23, 1982, at 2.
3. For the most comprehensive works, see infra notes 14, 34, 38, 39, 53, 55, 84, 85, 111,
127, 140.
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merit continued attention.
Part I will examine why the U.S. Supreme Court has viewed cam-
paign finance reform as different from the other political process move-
ments which likewise have sought to broaden access to politics and to
create greater political equality. An understanding of the Court's per-
ception will explain why the Court waited for the other branches of
government to act before becoming heavily involved in the issue. Part
II will examine certain central tendencies and anomalies in Supreme
Court reasoning once the Court began to react to local, state, and fed-
eral legislative activity in this sphere. Tensions between liberty and
equality and the Court's meaning of "free speech" will be reviewed
within the context of Buckley v. Valeo ,5 First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,6 and Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,7 leading
to the conclusion that powerful but often implicit factors are at work in
the Supreme Court's decisionmaking process. Part III will briefly dis-
cuss the impact of the Court's activism by examining how the Court
may have altered the nature and outcome of campaigns via its inter-
vention. Finally, part IV will focus on alternate routes, perhaps both
more effective and more difficult, to campaign finance reform--ones
that are more likely to be upheld by the current majority on the
Supreme Court.
I. The Possibility of Judicial Action Preceding Legislative
Attempts at Campaign Finance Reform
In the areas of voting rights,8 reapportionment, 9 poll taxes, 10 and
high filing fees," the U.S. Supreme Court moved on its own to ban
discriminatory practices, not deferring to congressional or state legisla-
tive action before entering the fray. In fact, the inactivity by the other
branches of government was often seen by the Court as the reason why
4. Campaign finance reform involves fundamental questions about the nature of de-
mocracy and the age-old question of who rules. Dean Sandalow commented upon this
point: "The choice between these arguments is in the end a choice between differing views
about the desirable shape of the American political system, views that rest upon strikingly
different conceptions of the meaning and requirements of democratic government." The
Distrust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 450 (1981).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
7. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
9. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
10. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
11. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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the judiciary should move to protect the sanctity of the ballot box, 12
and by others as the prime reason why the judiciary must be a vigilant
watchguard. 13 Given their boldness in working to protect the right to
vote, and in protecting the meaning of the right to vote against the
forces of dilution and economic constraints, why did the judiciary not
move to protect the vote against campaign finance abuses, such as those
that allowed wealthy people greater access and influence, and pre-
vented poor people from being able to run credible campaigns for
office? 14
Several factors seem crucial in explaining why campaign finance
reform has become the "stepchild" of the movement for protection of
the right to vote. Taken together these factors explain the complexity
of the issues involved in campaign finance questions, and the unique
set of forces operating on various sides of this matter.
First, campaign finance reform appears to involve a less clear con-
stitutional justification than at least some of the related issues of which
the judiciary has become an active protector. The right to vote is ex-
plicitly discussed in the Fifteenth Amendment,15 and the apportion-
ment of the U.S. House of Representatives is discussed in Article I,
section 2 of the Constitution.16 While both references are brief and not
without ambiguity, they are at least statements on the goals of voting
rights and equal apportionment. But the role (or the limitation) of
money in elections is never directly discussed in the Constitution. Al-
though this comparison alone might serve as an adequate explanation
of judicial inactivity, neither poll taxes nor filing fees are discussed ex-
plicitly in the Constitution. Yet this did not prevent the Supreme Court
from striking down these economic restrictions on access to the ballot.
12. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 553 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
193 (1962). In the case of reapportionment, there was often no other avenue besides the
judiciary for citizens to follow, since reapportionment in Tennessee and most states had to
be approved by malapportioned legislatures.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Ely does not directly discuss campaign finance
issues although he argues that the judiciary should police the process of representation and
be especially vigilant in guarding against legislation which would restrict the channels of
political change.
14. Perhaps Professors Joel Fleishman and Marlene Arnold Nicholson have examined
this question most thoroughly. See generally Fleishman, Public Financing of Election Cam-
paigns: Constitutional Constraints on Steps Toward Equali y of Political Influence of Citizens,
52 N.C.L. REv. 349 (1973), and Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26
STAN. L. REv. 815 (1974).
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
16. This section states that "[r]epresentatives. . . shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral states. . . according to their respective Numbers. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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As the issue of campaign finance reform re-emerged as a major
issue of political debate in the 1970's, several legal scholars noted that
recent judicial precedents involving the Equal Protection Clause might
be interpreted as requiring judicial action to prevent the political pro-
cess from being dominated by monied interests. 17 Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections,18 Reynolds v. Sims,' 9 and Bullock v. Carterz° all
contained language of concern over economic discrimination in voting.
In Bullock the Court went so far as to criticize high filing fees:
Many potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and
affluent backers are in every practical sense precluded from seek-
ing the nomination of their chosen party. . . . Not only are vot-
ers substantially limited in their choice of candidates, but also
there is the obvious likelihood that [high filing fees] would fall
more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community."z
In calling this practice a violation of equal protection, Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared that "we would ig-
nore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with unequal
weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic
status.""2 On the basis of this precedent, Professor Marlene Arnold
Nicholson noted that if candidate registration fees bar candidates of
modest means from running for office, "then surely the huge sums nec-
essary to wage an effective campaign. . . place much more formidable
roadblocks in the paths of such candidates. '23
Yet, as Nicholson, 4 Joel Fleishman,25 and Albert Rosenthal 6 all
noted, the lack of obvious "state action" involved in allowing large
sums to be spent on political campaigns made judicial activism on be-
half of campaign finance reform difficult. While governments had
passed laws requiring poll taxes and expensive filing fees, and had set
malapportioned district boundaries, governments had not passed laws
requiring or supporting large private expenditures. They merely acqui-
esced in the practice. In order for the courts to have moved in advance
of legislatures to reform campaign finance practices, they would have
17. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 14; Nicholson, supra note 14.
18. 383 US. 663 (1966).
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
21. Id. at 143-44.
22. Id at 144. Justices Rehnquist and Powell did not take part in the decision because
they were too recently appointed to the Court.
23. Nicholson, supra note 14, at 816.
24. Id at 830-836.
25. Fleishman, supra note 14, at 353-57.
26. Rosenthal, Campaign Financing andthe Constitution, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 365-
369 (1972).
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had to hold that governments had an obligation to prevent the unequal
access caused by the unequal use of money in political campaigns.27
While this approach had precedents,28 it would not have been an easy,
obvious step for the courts to take.
Thus, at best, campaign finance reform was a frontier issue for the
courts, one made more difficult by its amorphous grounding in the
Constitution and the need to find state action in campaign finance
practices. Yet the failure of the judiciary to take action to provide
equal protection to non-wealthy candidates and voters was probably
far more important than were the ameliorative effects of judicial action
to protect the rights of the non-wealthy in related areas of the political
process.
The second factor that influenced the judiciary was the difficulty in
fashioning judicially manageable remedies.2 9 "One man, one vote"
could be used to construct clear standards for reapportionment and
27. Nicholson noted that state action could be found in the fact that "campaign financ-
ing today can be viewed as a very significant part of the 'machinery for choosing officials,"'
Nicholson, supra note 14, at 831, and in state inaction. "Has the state permitted, even by
inaction, a private party to exercise such power over matters of high public interest that to
render meaningful the type of rights protected by the fourteenth amendment, the action of
the private person or organization must be deemed, for constitutional purposes, to be the
action of the state?" Id at 833, quoting St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A
New Look at State 4ction, Equal Protection, and "Trivate" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH.
L. REy. 993, 1011 (1961).
Likewise, Fleishman argued, "A court might very well reason that, by permitting some
candidates to spend large amounts of money which are not available to poorer citizens and
candidates, the legislation inevitably violates the equal protection requirement." Fleishman,
supra note 14, at 355 (emphasis in original). While Fleishman conceded that the differences
in spending might themselves be outside governmental reach, "their impact in an election
has been considered a proper subject of regulation by courts and legislators since the begin-
ning of the entury ... .We know that even governmental inaction in some circumstances
where action is required may constitute a violation of equal protection." Id Fleishman
reasoned that "unconstitutional inequities may arise from the impact of a classification by
government that fails to compensate for significant differences in classes that are not them-
selves the direct product of governmental action-that is, a state can deny equal protection
of the laws by treating unequals equally. . . .To rectify these denials of equal protection
the state may be required. . . to perform an 'affirmative duty."' Id (quoting Karst &
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT.
Rv. 39, 58).
With the hindsight afforded byBellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), which struck down certain
prohibitions on corporate spending even though state action had obviously created the cor-
poration, we now know that the Court's views were farther from the ideas of Fleishman,
Nicholson, and Rosenthal than any of them likely imagined. For more on the state action
component of Bellotti, see Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech:
The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 494.
28. See, e.g., Fleishman, supra note 14; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
29. For a more comprehensive discussion of remedies in this area, see Fleishman, supra
note 14, at 366-69.
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voting rights, but because campaigns require money, action to broaden
access did not have a single, obvious remedy. Merely prohibiting con-
tributions or expenditures above a certain amount had been the histori-
cal answer most in use around the country since the turn of the
century.3° This required setting specific dollar limits and trying to plug
loopholes, a task more legislative or administrative than judicial.31
Other remedies would have entailed substituting government aid for
corporate and individual funding no longer available from the wealthy,
thus providing a floor, a ceiling, or both for campaign spending.2
Matching governmental funds or outright grants would have required
raising revenue to support these programs. Judicially instituted pro-
grams would necessitate decisions on how to intervene, what standards
to set on the amount of contributions and expenditures that would be
allowed, or how much government money would be used to institute
campaign finance reform. The judiciary has been universally reluctant
to institute such programs on its own.
Striking down poll taxes and high filing fees forced governments
to raise revenue in other ways, but instituting a credible system of pub-
lic financing of elections would have required the raising of far greater
amounts of revenue. The severity of the problem seems at least partly
responsible for making it unlikely that the courts would intervene.33
Thus, while related action would not have made the development of
remedies impossible, judicial relief contained problems of greater pro-
portion and complexity than did reapportionment, poll taxes, filing
fees, or voting rights.
30. See supra note 1.
31. Of course, facing legislative or administrative problems did not stop judicial activity
in numerous other areas. See generally D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1977).
32. For a review of campaign finance practices in other Western democracies, see D.
ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY, ch. 9, (1975); K. Zev Paltiel, Campaign Finance:
Contrasting Practices and Reforms, in DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS 138-72 (D. Butler, H.
Penniman, & A. Ranney eds. 1981).
33. Referring to the public subsidization of campaigns, Fleishman said, "It is unlikely
that the Court would create an affirmative obligation where the costs of performing it are as
substantial as they would be here." Fleishman, supra note 14, at 367. It is possible, how-
ever, that court orders in cases involving matters such as prisons or school busing indirectly
require expenditures as large as the cost of public campaign financing. Furthermore, while
Fleishman's statement may be quite appropriate to a system of restrained judicial review, he
is really noting that if the violation of rights can be remedied cheaply, the Court is more
likely to act. If the violation of rights is of such a large magnitude as to require considerable
expenditures, as may be the case with campaign finance practices, the Court is more reluc-
tant to act.
Spring 1983] SYMPOSIUM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Where reform did not involve raising government funds for cam-
paigns, regulations limited the power of monied interests by protecting
the less wealthy and supporting a greater diversity of interests. 34 In this
respect the issue was similar to reapportionment in that it was viewed
as though a "zero-sum" issue: One side could not "gain" without the
other side "losing." The question of contribution and spending limita-
tions thus involved ambiguous treatment of constitutional rights, be-
cause protecting the rights of the non-wealthy could be viewed as
infringing on the rights of the rich.35 With the rights of the rich and
poor thus seen as potentially conflicting, reform could lead to charges
of violation of the wealthy's "freedom of speech."' 36 Because political
money was viewed as more closely related-either directly or indi-
rectly-to political speech than other issues aimed towards achieving
equality in elections, First Amendment issues were aroused by cam-
paign finance reform.37 Limits on political contributions and expendi-
34. There has been limited speculation on why the Congress, states, and localities have
been prone to limit spending rather than to subsidize campaigns. Spending limitations were
probably viewed as the easiest and simplest method that would directly remedy the alleged
wrongs of corruption and undue influence. Public financing was likely viewed as too costly
and too complicated. In addition, public financing could threaten incumbents, who gener-
ally have an advantage in fundraising, and who could be considered as spending taxpayer's
money to support themselves.
Restrictions on contributions and expenditures have been our traditional response from
the first period of campaign finance reform, see supra note 1. This response may have fol-
lowed such practices as regulating speakers at town meetings, and regulating the volume of
sound trucks. See generally, Freund, Commentary, in FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 71-75 (D. Rosenthal ed. 1971); Wright, Poli-
tics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). This method of re-
form probably also reveals something basic about the American view of government action.
Without as strong a history of a "positive state," we are more likely to prefer restrictions on
private activity than governmental obligations to protect the disadvantaged. In this respect
we differ from most other Western democracies. For more on this see K. DOLBEARE, AMER-
ICAN PUBLIC POLICY ch. 1 (1982).
35. Similar arguments were made by various economic interests in reapportionment
cases. It was on this issue that Chief Justice Earl Warren stated inJReynolds v. Sims: "Legis-
lators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or
cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our
legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representa-
tive of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock
of our political system." 377 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
36. Fleishman, supra note 14, at 407-10; Nicholson, supra note 14, at 844-47; Rosenthal,
supra note 26, at 372-78. This point is stated especially clearly in numerous writings by
Ralph Winter. See, e.g., Winter, Commentary, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, 75-81 (A. Rosenthal ed. 1972).
37. The Court seems to have assumed this, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-20,
as have most commentators. See, e.g., Court & Harris, infra note 87, especially at 214-18;
Freund, supra note 34; Rosenthal, supra note 26, especially at 372-78; and Winter, supra
note 36; but see Nicholson, supra note 14, at 816.
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tures in campaigns could affect the "marketplace of ideas,"38 muzzling
those forces in the society wanting to spend more, while simultaneously
allowing other, weaker forces in the polity a greater chance to be heard.
Of course, this was precisely the reason campaign finance reform had
been proposed. Thus, campaign finance reform, more so than with
other equal rights issues, could be viewed as cutting both ways.3 9
In light of the complexities involved, some may consider campaign
finance reform issues to be outside the reach of governmental edict.40
Yet, from early in the twentieth century, laws have regulated money in
political campaigns. Furthermore, in Burroughs v. United States,4 the
Supreme Court gave solid grounds for the regulation of campaign
38. Even to use the metaphor of the market in referring to free speech reveals certain
basic assumptions about the relationship of the economy to the political system. Perhaps the
most famous statement along these lines is from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissent in
Abrams v. United States: '[T]hat the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market." 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). On this idea Professor Mark Tushnet com-
mented: "If free speech was defended with the metaphor of the market, it was only a matter
of time and political circumstance before the market was defended w ith the metaphor and
the substance of free speech." Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech. in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 258 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). For powerful critiques of what
became the Supreme Court's reasoning on this point, see Wright, Money and the Pollution of
Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality? 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609
(1982); Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate
Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833 (1981); Comment, Cases that Shock the Conscience: Reflections
on Criticism of the Burger Court, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 713 (1980).
39. This was perhaps best noted by Daniel Polsby, who posed the dilemma as follows:
"[W]here the speech opportunities of a group in the aggregate, or of the average member of
a group, could be maximized, enhanced, or even made initially possible only by abridging
the speech of an individual, what (if anything) does the First Amendment command to be
done?" Polsby, Buckley v. Paleo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. CT.
Rnv. 1, 5 (1977). Numerous scholars have noted that the First Amendment is not the guard-
ian of "unregulated talkativeness," see, e.g., A. Meiklejobn, Free Speech and Its Relation to
Self Government 25 (1948), and that public bodies, from town meetings to the Supreme
Court, set procedures for the length of time that any individual may speak. Polsby stated
the fears of many in saying that "speech is not 'free' in any very important sense if it is
protected only when and to the extent that such protection is consistent with a congressio-
nally [or judicially?] defined notion of political equality." Polsby, supra at 42-43. For more
conflicting interpretations of campaign finance reform, see supra notes 1, 5, and infra notes
62, 89.
40. On civil rights issues this same point was often raised, as when whites charged that
federal laws on public accommodations moved beyond the bounds of governmental author-
ity. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). In Heart ofAtlanta
Motel, the rights of whites in the South were limited in order to enhance the rights of blacks.
The concern there, however, was with racial discrimination, not economic discrimination,
and the Constitution is much clearer on the prohibition of racial discrimination. Nonethe-
less, it is interesting to note that Congress defended its actions on public accommodations
not on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, but under the Commerce Clause. See id at 250.
41. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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finance.
42
In the modem era the crucial issue became how campaign finance
reform would be defined, for indisputably the issue could affect consti-
tutional rights-including the rights of free speech, free association,43
privacy,44 and equal protection as -in a myriad of profound and contro-
versial ways. This complexity made it easier to set campaign finance
reform apart from related areas of concern in the political process in
which, through the move toward greater equality, rights were being
nurtured and protected.
The previous points explain doctrinal reasons for which campaign
finance reform was to find itself a "stepchild" of the political reform
movement. Undoubtedly changes in Court personnel also played a
role in the decision by proponents of campaign finance reform to work
primarily through the legislative process rather than to push for bold
judicial action. By the time the issue had risen to political prominence
and had become, after the Watergate scandal, one of the most salient
issues in American politics, the Warren Court no longer existed. Presi-
dent Nixon's four appointees had a less expansive view of state action
and the Equal Protection Clause.4 6 In the place of interpretations ex-
panding the process of representation, the Burger Court began moving
toward a view characterized as protecting "the right to what money can
buy."' 47 This view is decidedly less sympathetic to the goals of cam-
paign finance reform, particularly the goal of seeking equal access to
the political process.
In view of the change in judicial personnel, the legislative arena
offered advocates of reform more hope of success. Although rarely did
campaign finance laws emerge victorious without compromise, in most
42. The issue in Burroughs was the power of Congress to require certain political com-
mittees involved in presidential elections to issue financial reports. The language of the
Court, however, was quite broad: "To say that Congress is without power to pass appropri-
ate legislation to safeguard such an electionfrom the improper use ofmoney to influence the
result is to deny to the nation . . . the power of self protection." Id at 545 (emphasis
added).
43. For more on the rights of free speech and free association, see supra sources cited in
notes 1, 5, 34.
44. Disclosure laws in particular involve potential violations of privacy, and courts have
addressed this question at some length. See, e.g. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-84. This issue,
however, will not be discussed here.
45. See supra note 14.
46. Yet the decision of Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) was supported by Justices
Burger and Blackmun.
47. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1129-35 (1978).
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states, and twice in Congress, broad legislation was passed.48 Tactically
this meant that where legislative success occurred, litigation arose from
forces opposed to campaign finance reform. Given the predilections of
the Justices, proponents were quickly put on the defensive.
Most likely as a result of the confluence of reasons set forth above,
campaign finance reform became an anomaly, to a large extent ignored
and then cut off by the judiciary from the broad movement for greater
political and electoral equality in the United States. While campaign
finance reform seems to follow logically from the Court's earlier reform
efforts for greater electoral and political equality, the merits of in-
dependent judicial action are sufficiently contestable that strong criti-
cism of the court for inaction is unwarranted.
II. Judicial Activity in Response to Other
Governmental Branches
When campaign finance reform re-emerged as a major issue upon
comprehensive action at federal, state, and local levels,49 the judiciary
could have responded in three ways. It could have deferred to the
other branches, as it had generally done in the period following the first
wave of reform at the turn of the century." Second, it could have en-
couraged further reform. Third, it could have discouraged reform by
striking down or limiting the statutes.
Chief Justice Burger and other recent Court appointees have gen-
erally argued that the Court has been too active in a number of areas of
48. See, e.g. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) and Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. VII-VIII, s5 Stat. 560-74; Act of
Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. For discussion of the numerous state laws
passed during this same period, see H. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at ch. 7.
49. See supra note 1.
50. With the burst of campaign finance reform activity at the turn of the century, there
was almost no litigation testing the laws, and corporate prohibitions and overall expenditure
limits were never directly challenged. The Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), and Act
of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, § 2, 37 Stat. 25 (updated as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070) (repealed 1972). The failure to challenge was most likely
the consequence of all sides recognizing the constitutionality of the laws, and because there
were enough loopholes to allow many to ignore the laws' intentions. See Leventhal, The
Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. Rnv. 345, 363-65 (1977). The Supreme Court
did occasionally hear arguments addressing certain features of the Corrupt Practices Act.
See, e.g., Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921). Limits on expenditures in federal
elections were promulgated in the 1911 Act, and were complemented by contribution ceil-
ings per the Hatch Act of 1939. See Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 4. 54 Stat. 767 (updated
in Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723) (repealed 1972). In 1926 two U.S. Senators
were denied their seats because of excessive spending. See Leventhal, supra at 364 n.134.
For a review of early litigation, see Leventhal, supra at 363-65; Rosenthal, supra note 26.
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constitutional interpretation, and that access to the Supreme Court has
been too broad.5' They have also argued that greater deference to the
legislative branches and to the states and localities is needed, as is the
need to conserve judicial resources.5 2 Yet, in spite of these concerns, the
Supreme Court has generally chosen the third option in dealing with
the issue of campaign finance reform. The Court has heard a great
many cases on this issue and has severely scrutinized federal, state, and
local legislation.13 In fact, the recently appointed more conservative
Justices, who have often been most associated with the drive for less
activism and greater deference, have generally been most vociferous in
51. See, e.g., Burger, How to Break Log/am in Courts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec.
19, 1977, at 21. "As judges, we should do everything we can to avoid imposing our own
notions of what is good for the country.... Many thoughtful, responsible people believed
the previous Supreme Court had gone too far in some areas." Id at 27. "'[Gloing to law' is
being overdone .... [W]e in America make excessive use of our courts. It's often been
said-and I think it's probably true--that the American people are the most litigious people
in the world." Id at 21. NEWSWEEK recently reported that "Burger has complained for so
long about the Court's docket that even he admits to sounding like the boy who cried wolf."
The Court'r Clogged Arteries, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 1983, at 81.
For comment upon the narrowing of access under the Burger Court, see Kremens v.
Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 140 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). What the Supreme Court has
simultaneously refused to hear while it was solicitous of campaign finance reform cases is
also revealing of its preferences, but an analysis of so broad an area is beyond the scope of
this article.
52. Following precedents would have led to deference to the solutions of contribution
and spending limitations. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, (D.C. Cir. 1975), and Rosen-
thal, supra note 26, at 363. Rosenthal notes: "'Corrupt practices' had long been a phrase of
art, not limited to bribery or undue influence-which a dictionary definition might suggest-
but directly applicable to contributions excessive in amount or from a forbidden source." 9
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. at 363.
For a convincing effort to reconcile inconsistencies in Burger Court doctrine and behav-
ior, see Comment, supra note 38. The authors argue that the Burger Court has engaged in
'judicial deregulation of persons or entities wielding power in American society." Id at
745. "Taken as a whole, the decisions manifest a consistent deference to the existing power
relationships of our society," id at 721, rather than a consistent deference to the other gov-
ernment branches, and to states and localities.
53. E.g., California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 454 U.S. 270 (1981); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
447 U.S. 557 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Abood v.
Board. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Pipefitters v.
United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1971). Joel Fleishman, although sympathetic to many of the
goals of campaign finance reform, has argued that strict scrutiny was appropriate "because a
sizable portion of those who are regulated by the legislation are the same as those who wrote
the legislation. . . ." Fleishman, he 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments.
he Shortcoming of Goodlntentions, 1975 DuKE L.J. 851, 885. In this he differs from others
such as Harold Leventhal and Justice Byron White. Compare Fleishman, supra, with
Leventhal, supra note 50, and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 257-66 (1976) (White, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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attacking campaign finance laws.54
The Court's dislike has been selective, as not all campaign legisla-
tion that equalizes access to the political process has been invalidated.
The court has generally been passive about those laws that minor par-
ties and civil libertarians claimed discriminated against them and sym-
pathetic to the claims of corporations and wealthy individuals.55
Buckley v. Valeo ,56 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,57 and Citi-
zens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley5 8 best serve to illustrate
the reactive use of the courts to oppose reform.5 9 The Court's decision
in Buckley emphasizes how differently the Court has treated campaign
finance legislation from other political process issues. It is also the
opinion which best articulates the Burger Court's philosophy in this
area. In Buckley, the Court overturned or modified important parts of
the broad federal legislation passed in 1974; the Court also overruled
much of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision,6 0 which
used quite different arguments and standards, and found the legislation
constitutional.6
54. Typical of the general view of what conservatives on the Court support, Alan
Ehrenhalt has reported "distinct conservative trends" in Court rulings. stating that "justices
were inclined to place more power and responsibility in the hands of state and local offi-
cials. . . . Ehrenhalt, CONG. Q. 1663 (July 10, 1982). But see Comment, supra note 38.
The general exception to this voting practice has been Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978), Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 30,
548 (1980) and Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
583 (1980). For more on Bellotti see infra text accompanying notes 100-39. For more on
Con Ed and Central Hudson, see infra note 141. For a review of the rankings of the Justices
on liberal-conservative scales, see Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946-
1978, 75 AiM. POL. Sci. Rv. 355 (1981).
55. For considerable elaboration on this point, see Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, 1977 WIs. L.
REv. 323, and infra, text accompanying notes 59-99.
56. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
57. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
58. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
59. This review will be selective because much has already been written about these
cases, especially Buckley. For the best comprehensive reviews of Buckley consult supra
sources cited in notes 34, 39, 55 and infra sources cited in note 111.
60. 519 F.2d 821 (1975). The D.C. Court of Appeals did strike down one small section
of the act. Id at 843.
61. The appellate court had held that regulating money in campaigns was speech-re-
lated conduct, and therefore subject to less rigorous scrutiny under the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court, however, held that money equaled speech, and that consequently the
law should be subject to strict scrutiny. The appellate court relied heavily on cases involving
wealth discrimination in the exercise of the franchise, and approved the government's goal
of equalizing access to political influence. The circuit court reasoned as follows: "It would
be strange indeed if, by extrapolation outward from the basic rights of individuals, the
wealthy few could claim a constitutional guarantee to a stronger political voice than the
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A. Equal Liberty, or Equality v. Liberty?6 2
The clash over equalizing access or protecting the rights of wealthy
candidates and individuals was met head on in the approaches taken
by the Supreme Court and the court of appeals. 6  The lower court
viewed the federal statutes as designed to effectuate the one person, one
vote principle, and to safeguard the integrity of elections;' the
Supreme Court, however, found much of the legislation to be a viola-
tion of the First Amendment right of free speech.
Given the importance of the topic and the dispute within the judi-
ciary, the Buckley decision produced a torrent of responses from a wide
variety of sources. 65 Because of the quantity and quality of responses
to the decision, only a few basic points will be deeply probed here. The
goal, as in part I, will be to understand why the judiciary acted as it did
by examining the Court's stated reasons and underlying assumptions.
unwealthy many because they are able to give and spend more money, and because the
amounts they give and spend cannot be limited." Id at 841.
The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's construction of the issue, and showed
less sympathy to the goal of establishing greater equality of access to campaign financing.
The Court commented: "[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment ... ." 424 U.S. at 48-49. With this premise they struck down overall
expenditure limits on federal campaigns and limits on what an individual could spend on his
own campaign. The Court also rejected any limits on what an individual could spend "inde-
pendently" on another's campaign. Based on the governmental interest of preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption, the Court did allow limitations on what an
individual could contribute to another's campaign. The majority upheld public funding of
presidential candidates, but made such procedures voluntary. The Court also upheld the
general disclosure requirements of the legislation, arguing that such procedures work to
dampen corruption and the appearance of corruption.
62. This general clash has been noted by a number of scholars. One especially
prominent attempt at resolution comes from Kenneth Karst, who notes that while some say
that First Amendment interests involve not equality but liberty, "[t]his line of argument is
misleading.... The principle of equality, when understood to mean equal liberty, is not
just a peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but rather part of the 'central
meaning of the First Amendment."' Karst, Equality as a Central Princple in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 20, 21 (1975) (footnote omitted). See also infra text
accompanying note 89.
63. Some might object to framing the issue in this manner, arguing that the distinction
should be couched in terms of protecting the "rights of hearers," the "rights of candidates,"
or the "rights of supporters." Yet the rights of any of these groups become relevant only if
one believes that the wealthy have more to say than others, and that non-wealthy interests
should listen more carefully to the wealthy than to other sources of ideas in society.
64. Yet even here there was some difficulty. Judge Bazelon remarked: "This case in-
volves the agonizing process of weighing competing values of the most fundamental impor-
tance in a democratic society: a statute designed to effectuate the one person, one vote
principle and to safeguard the integrity of elections against first amendment guarantees for
candidate and voters." 519 F.2d at 907 (emphasis in original).
65. See supra note 59.
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The fact that a majority of the Supreme Court decided to view money
as speech, rather than as speech-related conduct, has been commented
on by many.66 This article will probe the ideological and political im-
plications of such a conceptual leap.
The goal of the Supreme Court in Buckley seems to have been to
prevent quidpro quo corruption of politicians67 while preserving the
prerogatives of the wealthy to continue exercising greater influence in
the political arena. This conclusion is derived from an examination of
what was allowed and disallowed by the decision, and what reasons
were given for so ruling. By protecting the wealthy's right to spend
unlimited sums on their own races, to spend unlimited amounts on
elections so long as it is done "independently,"68 and to reject public
funds if the candidate feels that a more effective campaign can be ac-
complished through increased private spending, the Court preserved
important prerogatives of the wealthy while trying to "clean up" and
legitimize this power by detaching it from quidpro quo corruption. By
upholding disclosure and contribution limitations, as well as the idea of
public financing of elections, Buckley was a compromise decision; a
majority on the Court felt it important to uphold the restraints upon
those forms of financial activity most clearly connected with corrupt
practices. The Court was no doubt sensitive both to the Watergate
scandal and to the shaken public confidence in government and the
electoral process.69 Yet with Buckley, the wealthy were able to keep
66. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 34; Freund, supra note 34.
67. This point is developed in another article. See Shockley, Direct Democracy, Cam-
paign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and Declining Voter
Confidence Be Found? (1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file at HASTINGS CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw QUARTERLY).
68. In Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23, the Court argued that money spent "independently"
of a candidate's campaign could not be subject to the spending limitation because such
funds were expenditures rather than contributions. This distinction has created a loophole
in the 1974 Act that is of increasing importance as more funds are channeled into "in-
dependent" expenditures, some of which may not really be "independent" of a candidate's
campaign. For problems with the abuse of this judicially created loophole, see Buchsbaum,
Campaign Finance Re-Reform: The Regulation of Independent Political Committees, 71
CALIF. L. REv. 673 (1983).
69. This lack of public confidence has continued since Buckley. The campaign finance
reform after Buckley seems to have had little effect on citizen discouragement over the role
of money in politics. The Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research at
the University of Michigan has been asking citizens for a number of years: "Would you say
the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it
is run for the benefit of all people?" A consistently increasing percentage of people are
answering that government is run by a few big interests. In 1958 only 15% of the survey
agreed with that view, while in 1980 76% were agreed that government is run by a few big
interests. Public Opinion 34 (June/July, 1981). Ira Mickenberg noted: "It seems ironic that
the Court should recognize the dangers posed by the excessive importance of these mass-
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their options open in a manner that middle class and poorer citizens,
and candidates with only middle class or poorer supporters, simply
could not.
To protect the differential impact of wealth by striking down laws
on grounds of a violation of "free speech" has been imitated by no
other Western democracy."0 The Court's opinion in Buckley has led to
analogies and inconsistencies that are helpful in discovering underlying
ideological presuppositions. There may be reasons to protect the pre-
rogatives of the wealthy in American politics, but to do so on the
grounds offree speech is remarkable.7 A more accurate justification
would be that "our social system is based on the premise that inequali-
ties of wealth serve valid and useful purposes," and that "the wealthy
need means to exercise their financial power to defend themselves po-
litically against the greater numbers who may believe that their eco-
nomic interests militate toward leveling."7 2  Since "money can be
considered as a countervailing force to a natural majority, or to a large
aggregate of voters,"73 and such a countervailing force is needed,74 the
media techniques, while simultaneously institutionalizing such excessive use by equating
expenditure of money with pure speech." Mickenberg, The Constitutionality ofLimitations on
Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 527, 535 n.55 (1981). He
concluded that "the Supreme Court accepts the idea of a political system dominated by
those wealthy enough to have access to mass media and excluding those who express their
political views by other means." Id at 534 n.44. The fact that citizen confidence in the
electoral process is very low, and that many attempts by federal, state and local governments
to restrict money in elections have been struck down by the Court, implies that the Court is
imposing a particular view of the First Amendment on our society. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 72-158.
70. See supra note 32. Of course, judicial review is quite rare in most other Western
democracies.
Some might argue that the protection of the wealthy was the result of the Buckley deci-
sion, not its cause, with the actual cause being the right to spend one's money in the "mar-
ketplace of ideas" as one sees fit. But to have selected such a cause in these circumstances,
and not in circumstances where the result would lead to a weakening of established power
(e.g., the list of assertions upheld and denied in Comment, supra note 38 at 719-21, and the
comparison of the concern for the poor in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) with the cases discussed by Laurence Tribe, supra note 47, at 1129-35) suggests the
use of a cause to achieve a desired result. See supra note 52, infra note 83, and text accom-
panying notes 123-39.
71. Each of these concepts will be explored more fully below. See infra part II-B.
72. Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath and Its Prospects: The Constitu-
tionality of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1327,
1335 (1976).
73. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 17.
74. Although this need is never explicitly stated in the Constitution, James Madison's
Federalist Paper No. 10 is probably the most famous defense of the necessity for barriers in
the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 56 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Others
have noted that such a view of the First Amendment fosters ideological hegemony by the
economic elite in our society. See Meadow, Political Advertising as Grassroots Lobbying:
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wealthy should be allowed, or indeed, should be considered to have
earned, special political privileges not given to the majority of citizens.
These beliefs are alive today in the ideas that the wealthy have more at
stake in the political system and that their activity is particularly neces-
sary to the overall health of the economic, social, and political structure
of the society.7
The Supreme Court majority did not explicitly use this argument
in protecting the rights of the wealthy, but analysis of what the
Supreme Court struck down leads to the conclusion that these beliefs
must have been the motivating force behind their decision.7 6 In a re-
vealing passage, the majority stated that limiting a candidate and his
family to personal expenditures of $25,000, $35,000, or $50,000 annu-
ally (depending upon the office), "imposes a substantial restraint on the
ability of persons to engage in protected First Amendment expres-
sion.' 77  If one agrees with the Court that being able to spend only
New Forms of Corporate Political Participation 20 (paper presented at the Midwest Political
Science Association Annual Convention, Cincinnati, Ohio (Apr., 1981)).
75. Of course "Reaganomics," as either "supply-side" or "trickle-down" theory, would
fit well with this view of the First Amendment. The political concept, however, is broader
than either of these economic theories. See Greider, The Education of David Stockman, 248
ATLANTIC 27 (Dec., 1981).
Professor Tribe may have stated this view most clearly: "[W]hat emerges from the deci-
sions of the past several years is a wavering commitment to maintain for the poor access to
...the political process. . and a determined. . . though again not openly proclaimed,
commitment to preserve for the non-poor ways of purchasing distance and distinction from
the less fortunate-to preserve, in effect, plenty of room at the top, without wholly aban-
doning protection at the bottom." L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1135.
76. Some might argue that without clear state action, wealth classifications are not ger-
mane to the First Amendment. Yet the legislative branches of the government believed
wealth is germane since they found it necessary to impose limits on the wealthy. In coming
to the rescue of the rich, the Supreme Court had to ignore or avoid powerful reasons for
governmental action. See L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 802 n.9; see also supra note 63. In
noting that Court decisions in this broad area of "the right to what money can buy" are not
insupportable, Tribe has said that "the confidence with which the Court espoused conclu-
sions that were at best debatable leads one to wonder whether unarticulated premises must
not have been strongly guiding the Court's hand." L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1132 n.12.
77. 424 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). This idea has been stated even more strongly by
others. See, e.g., M. JOHNSTON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA
163-64 (1982): "A genuine equalization of contributions would require limits set so low-at,
say, $100 or $250-that it would make political giving meaningless as a form of expression
and thoroughly impoverish political campaigns." But how wealthy must one be to consider
a gift of $250 meaningless?
These ideas are contrary to the reasoning behind Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
wherein the Warren Court stated that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right tofull
and effective particopation in the political processes. . . . [This] requires. . . that each citi-
zen have an equally effective voice in the election. . . . Modem and viable state government
needs, and the Constitution demands, no less." Id at 565 (emphasis added). See Nichol-
son, supra note 14, at 828.
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$25,000 to $50,000 annually on campaigning is in fact a substantial re-
straint upon constitutional expression, what does this say about the
rights of the ninety-nine percent of the American electorate who cannot
expend even this "substantially restrained" amount?7" Since their abil-
ity to speak is presumably restrained even more, where are they to look
for the protection of their First Amendment rights?7 9 The greatest rev-
elation of the Court's perspective on the special rights of the wealthy is
the Court's own lack of concern for the basic rights of the majority.
The right to spend tens of thousands of dollars annually influencing
political campaigns is simultaneously fundamental and exclusive. It
belongs only to those few who have the resources.
In an equally revealing quote, the Supreme Court stated that the
$1,000 ceiling on spending for a clearly identified candidate "would
appear to exclude all citizens. . . from any significant use of the most
effective modes of communication."80 In thus striking down limits on
expenditures the Court freed the wealthy to engage in significant use of
78. While numerous scholars have discussed income and wealth inequality in American
society, Lester Thurow's analysis is one of the most persuasive. See L. THUROW, THE ZERO-
SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE (1980). In
addition to noting that the United States has the second-highest inequality of all Western
democracies (far higher than either West Germany or Japan), id at 7-8, Thurow states that
"the top quintile of all households has almost 80% of total wealth. . . . Id at 168.
79. It hardly needs pointing out at a time with from 15% to 17% of our work force
unemployed, underemployed, or too discouraged to look for work, see, e.g., Thurow, The
Cost of Unemployment, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1982, at 70, that many Americans may not be
able to contribute or spend any money on campaigns. ADAMANY & AGREE, supra note 32,
at 123-28. The overwhelming majority of Americans do not contribute, for no doubt a vari-
ety of reasons. See, e.g., G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 199-200
(1980).
80. 424 U.S. at 19-20 (emphasis added). The complete quotation reads: "The $1,000
ceiling on spending 'relative to a clearly identified candidate' [citation omitted] would ap-
pear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institu-
tional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of communication."
Elsewhere in the Buckley decision the Court noted that virtually every means of com-
municating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditures of money, and that the
"electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and
information has made these expensive modes of communications indispensable instruments
of effective political speech." Id at 19 (emphasis added). Two years later in First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978), the Court held that where the "sup-
pression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended."
Id at 785-86 (emphasis added); see infra text accompanying notes 100-39. Yet the Court
had already noted that the side with money has the advantage, since money is "indispensa-
ble." The ironies of this point are missed completely in Note, Money Talks: Constitutional
Protection of Corporate Political Speech," 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 575 (1979), which quotes ap-
provingly of these passages. As Patton & Bartlett, supra note 27, at 510, have noted, "[T]he
law is not given the luxury of adopting a political position which has no political
consequences."'
696 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:679
the most effective modes of communication. But what are the Justices
saying about the great majority of the American people who cannot
spend more than $1,000 on candidates they support? By the Court's
own words, a majority of the American people are excluded from effec-
tive communication.
To justify supporting such fundamental and exclusive rights in a
democracy, the Court presumably must believe that such rights should
not be hereditary or discriminatory. To put the matter in constitutional
language, these rights should not be exercised in a manner which vio-
lates the due process or equal protection rights of others seeking the
opportunity to become wealthy enough so that spending $25,000 to
$50,000 a year would be a "substantial restraint" upon their First
Amendment rights."'
To reconcile the concepts of due process and equal protection of
the laws with Buckley, it seems that one must believe that the American
economic system is open and fair enough to allow each citizen an equal
opportunity to gain enough monetary resources such that being able to
spend only tens of thousands of dollars a year on campaigns actually
would violate the person's First Amendment rights. Whether a major-
ity on the Supreme Court endorses this notion is unclear, since such
reasoning about the fundamentals of democracy, justice, equality, and
liberty is not explicitly expressed, but must be inferred from the Court's
opinion. 2 Yet, without such an ideological perspective, is there any
other way the Court could have reached such conclusions in Buckley? 3
81. Many have discussed the degree of social mobility in American society. See gener-
ally L. THUROW, supra note 78, at ch. 7. Thurow notes that 50% of the very rich received
their fortunes through inheritance. Id at 172. By capitalizing on above average returns on
investments others have rapidly acquired large fortunes. Id at 173. Yet, "since no one can
predict these opportunities for capitalizing, real disequilibriums. . will appear, the win-
ners are, as in any lottery, lucky rather than smart or meritocratic." Id at 175 (emphasis
added). For discussion of governmental complicity in the accumulation of wealth, see L.
TRiBE, supra note 47, at 802 n.9; Patton & Bartlett, supra note 27, at 496, 510 n.32 and see
Justice White's dissent in CARC, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
82. Another famous statement from Buckley also reveals underlying ideological beliefs:
"The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgement of free expression
cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public discus-
sion." 424 U.S. at 49. In its stark form, it is difficult to see how, once one decides money is
speech, such a statement could coexist with the concept of taxation. See sources cited supra
note 81.
83. See supra note 63. When the results lead in a different direction, the Court can be
surprisingly cognizant of the "dangers" of wealth. In CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973), Chief Justice Burger agreed to allow CBS to refuse to run a paid political
advertisement against the Vietnam War. The public interest in providing access to the mar-
ketplace of ideas "would scarcely be served," id at 123, by compelling broadcasters to ac-
cept paid political advertisements, because this procedure would be "so heavily weighted in
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If the answer is no, it appears that the Supreme Court's theory of the
First Amendment and campaign finance reform rests upon the assump-
tions of free market capitalism. This is a very narrow base for a theory
of free speech 4 --and certainly goes against some of the basic ideas of
the meaning of the First Amendment and the concept of democracy in
Western political thought.
The First Amendment has "usually been thought of as a vehicle by
which otherwise powerless people can gain power," not as a means to
protect those in power against the powerless. 85 As money has become
favor of the financially affluent, or those with access to wealth." Id at 123. Skelly Wright
summarized the Court's view as follows: "Even under a first-come, first-served system, the
Chief Justice continued, 'the views of the affluent could well prevail over those of the others,
since they would have it within their power to purchase time more frequently,' and they
might monopolize the available time. Requiring broadcasters, under the Fairness Doctrine,
to provide free time for opposing views would not redress the imbalance, because 'the afflu-
ent could still determine in large part the issues to be discussed.' The right of access, the
Chief Justice concluded, 'would have little meaning to those who could not afford to
purchase time in the first instance."' Wright, supra note 38, at 630 (footnotes omitted).
Wright found irony in the Court's reasoning when comparing it to the campaign finance
reform decisions. Id at 631-32.
84. See generall Tribe, Toward a Aetatheory of Free Speech, in CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA I (R. Collins ed. 1980). Edwin Firmage and Kay Christensen
speak of the "canonization" of Adam Smith, Firmage & Christensen, Speech and Campaign
Reform: Congress, the Courts and Community, 14 GA. L. RaV. 195, 198 (1980), and argue
that "the Court should play a decisive role in assuring that the various checks and balances
and interest groups within our governmental and economic systems do not become so dispa-
rate as to render any metaphor of the 'marketplace' completely unrealistic." Id at 218.
Wright explains the Court's philosophy as follows: "A latter-day Anatole France might well
write, after observing American election campaigns, 'The law, in its majestic equality, allows
the poor as well as the rich to form political action committees, to purchase the most sophis-
ticated polling, media, and direct mail techniques, and to drown out each other's voices by
overwhelming expenditures in political campaigns."' Wright, supra note 38, at 631.
It is important to note that not all aspects of the Court's decisions in campaign finance
fit neatly into a simple view focusing on protection of the prerogatives of the wealthy. The
refusal to allow the California Medical Association to contribute unlimited funds to a polit-
ical action committee, California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 435 U.S. 182 (1981), and the refusal
to hear the case brought by the Republican National Committee challenging the constitu-
tionality of expenditure limitations applying to candidates who accept public funds, Repub-
lican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 445 U.S. 955 (1980), are examples of the Court ruling against
monied interests. But the fact that the Court has not applied its campaign finance extension
of Lochner, see infra note 94, to every opportunity does not negate the fact that it has used
this approach in important cases which have twisted the impact of attempted campaign fi-
nance reform away from the goal of equality. The Court's goal, despite occasional inconsis-
tencies or the necessity of compromise, still seems to be the preserving of the prerogatives of
the wealthy to continue exercising greater political influence, while preventing their nar-
rowly defined quidpro quo corruption of politicians.
85. Tushnet, supra note 38, at 257. For further development of this analysis, see
Wright, supra note 38: "[B]y equating political spending with political speech and according
both the same constitutional protection, the Court placed the first amendment squarely in
opposition to the democratic ideal of political equality." Id at 631-32. "[T]he core notion
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more important to electoral success or for citizen influence,8 6 our sys-
tem has lost able candidates.87 One need not be a political radical to
question whether having our political leaders come only from the
wealthier strata, or be dependent on these strata, is necessarily best for
the society. As John Stuart Mill said,
We need not suppose that when power resides in an exclusive
class, that class will knowingly and deliberately sacrifice the other
classes to themselves: it suffices that, in the absence of its natural
defenders, the interest of the excluded is always in danger of be-
ing overlooked: and, when looked at is seen with different eyes
from those of the person whom it directly concerns.8
More recently, John Rawls has propounded a constitutional principle
of equal liberty, which "requires that all citizens are to have an equal
right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitu-
tional process that establishes the laws with which they are to com-
ply.' 89 In arguing for governmental obligations to "underwrite a fair
opportunity to take part in and influence the political process. . . irre-
spective of their economic and social class," 90 Rawls noted that "[tihe
liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of their
value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to
use their advantages to control the course of public debate."91 Of
of the first amendment remains the protection of diverse, antagonistic, and unpopular
speech from restriction based on substance. To invoke the first amendment, not to protect
diversity, but to prevent society from defending itself against the stifling influence of money
in politics is to betray the historical development and philosophical underpinnings of the
first amendment." Id at 636.
For a critique of the Burger Court's attempt to require that "freedom of association" be
enforced through the protection of multi-million dollar corporate advertising campaigns
from regulation, see Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions.- Recent Experi-
ence, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 505, 584-85
(1982).
86. See infra text and accompanying notes 159-81 and the Supreme Court's own words
on the subject, supra notes 77 and 80.
87. See infra text and accompanying notes 159-91 for some conjiecture and limited em-
pirical evidence on this point. Leonard Court and Charles Harris discuss this point, saying
that it is one of the basic reasons for campaign finance reform. Citing congressional hear-
ings and other sources, they state, "[Tioday the ablest citizens may be dissuaded from seek-
ing elective office because of the soaring costs of campaigns and the obligations, real or
imaginary, which large contributions may entail." Court & Harris, Free Speech Implications
of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 214, 216 (1972).
88. J.S. MILL, That the Ideally Best Form of Government is Representative Government,
in CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ch. III (1875), quoted in Court &
Harris, supra note 87, at 216-17.
89. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 221 (1971). See also Karst, supra note 62.
90. Id at 224-25.
91. Id at 225. Rawls also observed: "Historically one of the main defects of constitu-
tional government has been the failure to insure the fair value of political liberty. The nec-
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course, Rawls was writing as a political philosopher, not as a constitu-
tional scholar,92 but for the Court to rule that the First Amendment
prohibits the governments of the United States from moving in this di-
rection requires an exceptionally narrow ideological interpretation of
the meaning of the First Amendment. Furthermore, this ruling implies
a concommitant view that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause is either irrelevant or so weak that it does not hinder the
Court's interpretation of the First Amendment. 93 In this conception of
a supposedly free market capitalist First Amendment, just how far we
are from Lochner v. New York94 is not clear.
B. The Meaning of "Free Speech"
Most of us are aware that some persons can change the meaning of
words and force us to accept one metaphor rather than another.95 For
the Supreme Court to call moneyfree at the very time that they are
aware of its exclusivity, and in fact are protecting its exclusivity, is a
powerful example of the Court's ability to influence our political think-
ing. Presumably the Court does not mean that money isfree, but that it
is associated with freedom, or perhaps is a prerequisite to freedom, in a
sense that must be very close to or synonymous with liberty. Yet to
link money to freedom or liberty, as one does in protecting its exclusiv-
ity, and then to yoke it to speech, furthers our deference towards
money. Defending the prerogatives of money in campaigns under the
concept of free speech requires a unique ideological perspective. Al-
though many have noted that equating money with speech as a means
essary corrective steps have not been taken, indeed, they never seem to have been seriously
entertained." Id at 226. Rawls was writing in 1971, as the campaign finance reform issue
was about to re-emerge as a central issue in American politics.
92. But see Wiseman, The New Supreme Court Commentators: The Princioled, the Polit-
ical, and the Philosophical, 10 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 315, 392-93 (1982) (documenting the
influence of modern political philosophers, including Rawls, on constitutional law
commentators).
93. To be more precise, the Supreme Court has not ruled out all avenues to greater
political equality. See infra text and accompanying notes 192-200. It has, however, ruled
out or created loopholes in most of the approaches tried by federal, state, and local govern-
ments. For more on the havoc wreaked by the annulments and loopholes caused by Court
rulings, see Darr & Tifft, Campaign Finance Reform Fails in Essential Mission, Legal Times
of Wash., Apr. 20, 1981, at 8, col 1.
94. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This case invalidated a New York statute that forbade bakery
employees from working more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week, on grounds that
government intervention to protect workers violated the right of freedom of contract be-
tween employee and employer, and thus violated the free market system. For an analysis
comparing current Supreme Court doctrines on campaign finance to the Court's approach in
Lochner, see Note, supra note 38, at 1853.
95. For an analysis of this point, see M. EDELMAN, POLITICAL LANGUAGE (1977).
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of protecting the influence of money in politics is already an ideological
leap,96 to do so under the concept of free speech can easily lead to
confusion. The Court is saying simultaneously that free speech is not
free, and that some should apparently have more free speech than
others. The rich must be protected in their free speech, which others
obviously do not have.97
If the government wants to subsidize the rights of the majority via
the fairness doctrine, tax credits, or matching funds,98 it may do so-
but it is under no constitutional obligation to so act. The government is
obligated not to infringe on the fundamental rights of the wealthy to
spend whatever they want on their own campaigns, in independent ex-
penditures on any other races, or in expenditures or contributions to
ballot propositions.99 The exercise of our constitutional rights of free
speech requires the amount of money that only a few in our society
have.
C. Corporate Free Speech and Ballot Propositions
Much of the Court's reasoning in Buckley was amplified and ex-
tended in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, °o a case decided
two years later by a 5-4 majority. 10 In Bellotti, the Court protected
96. See, e.g., Wright and Freund, supra note 34, and the comments of Justice White,
cited supra note 81.
97. See L. TRIBE, supra note 47, at 1135. In this case, however, it is not at all clear that
Tribe is correct when he states that "whatever the doctrinal strains, the Burger Court will not
refuse lifelines to those about to drown, even if it will throw them from a point perched
safely above the disquieting signs of distress . . . ." Id at 1135. Rather, the Court reluc-
tantly allows other branches of the government to throw lifelines, but does so only if the
rescues still preserve "plenty of room at the top." Id The result is that many ordinary
citizens drown.
98. To receive matching funds one must first have raised a certain amount of money.
For this reason Fleishman argued that having an exclusively monetary measure to qualify
for government subsidies violated the equal protection of those without significant financial
resources. Fleishman, supra note 53, at 885-96. On many of the points discussed the Court
could have given much more sympathetic treatment to constitutional bases supporting
greater equality of access to the political process. It did not do so because it was not in
sympathy with the goal.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 100-39.
100. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
101. Changes in Court personnel were likely crucial in the outcome of the case. Four of
the five Justices appointed by Presidents Ford and Nixon were in the majority. For compre-
hensive works on Bellotti, see Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The Effect of First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67
Ky. L.J. 75 (1978-79); Kiley, P4Cing the Burger Court: The Corporate Right to Speak and
the Public Right to Hear After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 22 Aiuz. L. REv. 427 (1980);
Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union Cam-
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from state interference the right of corporations to spend unlimited
funds on ballot propositions.
The case arose in Massachusetts,' 0 2 a state that has had a long
history of litigation over legislative attempts to limit corporate spend-
ing on ballot proposals.'0 3 The law challenged by corporations in Bel-
lotti was a moderate reform measure that prohibited corporate
spending on ballot proposals in which corporations were not "materi-
ally affected" by the outcome.' 4 Corporations, however, feared that if
this prohibition were upheld, limits on campaign contributions might
be placed on "materially affected" corporations. 0 5 The Massachusetts
law stipulated that a personal income tax (as opposed to a corporate
income tax) did not "materially affect" corporations. 0 6 As a result,
corporations were forbidden from spending corporate treasury funds to
oppose a referendum instituting a progressive personal income tax. 07
The Supreme Court side-stepped the historically thorny question
of to what extent a corporation could be considered a "person" entitled
to First Amendment rights of free speech. 0 Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, couched the matter in terms of the citizen's right to hear
all sides of an issue, including a corporation's speech. 10 9
In Bellotti, the Court refined the concept of quidpro quo corrup-
tion enunciated in Buckley, holding that ballot propositions concern
paign Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 945 (1980); Patton & Bartlett,
supra note 27; Note, supra note 38.
The critique of aspects of the Court's reasoning set forth in this Article is not meant to
imply that the Massachusetts law was without fault. The purpose here is to show that the
reasoning the Court employed reveals certain unarticulated, ideological premises. For criti-
ques of the Massachusetts law, see, e.g., Nicholson, supra and Fox, supra note 101.
102. 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E. 2d 1262 (1977).
103. For a thorough discussion of the history of Bellotti, see Fox, supra note 101.
104. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, §§ 8-88a (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978). "No corporation
... shall.., expend or contribute. . . any money or other valuable thing for the purpose
of... influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than
one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation."
105. Oral Argument, Belloid, 435 U.S. 765 (Nov. 9, 1977).
106. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, §§ 8-88a (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978). "No question sub-
mitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income property or transactions of
individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the
corporation.
107. Fox, supra note 101, at 77-78. The provision of the Massachusetts Constitution
which allows income taxes has always forbidden graduated rates, see MAss. CONST. amend.
art. 44, and voter approval is required to amend the Constitution. See Fox, supra note 101,
at 78 n.21.
108. 435 U.S. at 776-78.
109. Id at 777. 'The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual." Id
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ideas, not people, and therefore could not be bought. " Although the
Buckley decision contained some factual analysis of the role and im-
pact of money, the Court there was internally inconsistent-at times
demanding proof of adverse effects and at other times merely assuming
that certain practices could lead to corruption, the appearance of cor-
ruption, or to the undermining of voter confidence."' In Bellotli the
Court consistently demanded a higher level of proof: "[T]he risk of
corruption,""' "undue influence," or destruction of "the confidence of
people in the democratic process and the integrity of government"' '" 3
all needed to be supported by "record or legislative findings.""'
In light of the Court's emphasis on empirical evidence, how such
evidence was used, or not used, in the Massachusetts case is worthy of
note. Four years before the 1976 referendum, Massachusetts voted on
a graduated personal income tax measure. The referendum was de-
feated by a wide margin, with corporations opposing the measure
spending far more than proponents." ' In 1976, with the new Massa-
chusetts law in effect, corporate treasury funds could not be spent to
oppose the measure, but the measure was still defeated. From this Jus-
tice Powell concluded that "any inference that corporate contributions
'dominated' the electoral process on this issue is refuted by the 1976
election."" 6
110. 435 U.S. at 790. "The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections ... simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue." Id See Shockley,
supra note 67, for a discussion of this subject in greater detail.
11I. A number of scholars have commented on this point, using a variety of examples.
See Chevigny, The Paradox of Campaign Finance, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 206, 207 (1981);
Leventhal, supra note 50, especially at 358-59; Mickenberg, supra note 69, at 529, 538, 539
n.73; Schneider, Buckley v. Valew" The Supreme Court and Federal Campain Reform, 76
COLUM. L. Rav. 852, 854 (1976).
112. 435 U.S. at 790.
113. 435 U.S. at 789-90. Powell tempered the decision by stating that if evidence were
marshalled to show that "corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine demo-
cratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these
arguments would merit our consideration." Id at 789. But see infra, text accompanying
notes 137-38."
114. 435 U.S. 789-90. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38. The Court did not say
what kind of evidence would be considered convincing.
115. 435 U.S. at 811 (White, J., dissenting). "The Committee for Jobs and Government
Economy. . .raised and expended approximately $120,000 to oppose the proposed amend-
ment, the bulk of it raised through large corporate contributions. . . In contrast, the Coa-
lition for Tax Reform, Inc., the only political committee organized to support the 1972
amendment, was able to raise and expend only approximately $7,000." Id.
116. 435 U.S. at 790 n.28. Even on this point, logic might have led to a different result.
In Bellotti, Powell carefully emphasized the right of listeners to hear all sides, and avoided a
decision on whether or not corporate rights to First Amendment freedoms should be viewed
as coextensive with those of natural persons. Given this emphasis on the listeners, the Court
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Justice Powell's conclusions may have been premature. The 1976
results did prevent reformers from arguing that without corporate
spending in opposition, the side in favor of progressive taxation would
win. But the Court failed to recognize that despite the prohibition on
direct corporate spending, the forces against the proposal still had ten
times as much money at their disposal as did the proponents.
17
Of equal importance to these totals is the fact that corporations
were able to spend money fighting a variety of other Massachusetts
ballot proposals in 1976 in which they would have been "materially
affected" by the outcome. A record-breaking $3,000,000 in corporate
funds was used to defeat a variety of proposals in the state.11 On three
of these measures, corporations and trade associations made the same
arguments that were used against the graduated personal income tax
proposal. Corporations charged that these measures would hurt the
"business climate" of the state, leading to relocation of plants in other
states or to a slowdown in growth, resulting in a loss of jobs, and a
weakening of the already slack Massachusetts economy." 9 Two days
after the election, the Boston Globe remarked that, "Massachusetts
business flexed its political muscle Tuesday as never before, climaxing
a massive spending campaign and an unprecedented grassroots drive
with the defeat of four economic referendums, capitalizing on the
growing public concern over the state's economy."' 120
An examination of the 1976 campaign in Massachusetts therefore
does not lead to the conclusion that Justice Powell reached. If any-
thing, analysis reveals the weakness and limitations of the Massachu-
setts law. The statute did not stop corporations from pouring millions
could have concluded that the public was hearing corporate points of view quite adequately
without direct corporate spending because the voters rejected the referendum.
117. Opponents spent approximately $115,000 in individual contributions in 1976, while
proponents mustered only $10,000. Boston Globe, Nov. 3, 1976, at 7, col. 2. This most
likely occurred because corporate personnel were still free to spend their own wealth to
present their own point of view. The sources of the $115,000 may never be known because
the state of Massachusetts accidentally destroyed the contribution records for the 1976 elec-
tions. Interview with Steve Lydenberg, a research associate for the Council on Economic
Priorities, Brookline, Massachusetts, Summer, 1982.
118. Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 1976, at 1, col. 4. These included proposals for a public
power authority, uniform electric rates that would end discrimination against small users, a
ban on certain private handguns, and the imposition of a mandatory 5¢ deposit on bottles
and cans. See P. Guzzi, Massachusetts Informationfor Voters (1976).
119. For example, see advertisements against flat utility rates and the bottle bill. Boston
Globe, Nov. 1, 1976, at 9, 16; Nov. 2, 1976, at 3; Nov. 3, 1976 at 7; and Nov. 4, 1976, at 9.
The latter article includes a statement by then Representative Barney Frank: "The argument
that we must give first priority to improving the climate for business is about the most pow-
erful political force currently operative in Massachusetts." Id, Nov. 4, 1976, at 9.
120. Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
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of dollars into the state's referendum campaigns. In fact, corporate
contributions may have dominated the Massachusetts electoral process
in 1976.' 2'
Having disposed of the corruption and domination issues,12 2 the
majority was able to protect powerful economic interest in the political
process. Yet Justice Powell's arguments in Bellotti are curiously differ-
ent from those he made only six years earlier in another case involving
limits to campaign spending, Ppefitters v. United States.123 In P#pefit-
ters, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented from the
Court's holding that under federal law, unions could maintain a polit-
ical fund so long as money was collected from voluntary contributions
and went into a separate funding account. 124 Powell believed that al-
lowing unions and corporations to amass contributions for political
campaigns would "have a profound effect upon the role of labor unions
and corporations in the political life of this country." '25 There was ap-
parently no need then for sound empirical evidence to prove the
"profound effect" such money would have. Powell lamented that the
holding in Piefitters
revers[es] a trend since 1907, [and] opens the way for major par-
ticipation in politics by the largest aggregations of economic
power, the great unions and corporations. This occurs at a time,
paradoxically, when public and legislative interest has focused on
limiting-rather than enlarging-the influence upon the elective
process of concentrations of wealth and power.1 6
He reasoned that allowing voluntary contributions from union
members
goes a long way toward returning unions and corporations to an
unregulated status with respect to political contributions. This
opening of the door to extensive corporate and union influence
on the elective and legislative processes must be viewed with gen-
uine concern. This seems to me to be a regressive step as con-
trasted with the numerous legislative and judicial actions in
recent years designed to assure that elections are indeedfree and
121. The Court's emphasis on empirical evidence and subsequent conclusion that corpo-
rations did not dominate the electoral process is problematic for reasons other than those
already mentioned in this text. It was not established at any stage of the proceedings that
corporations were not dominating the process. Even if they were not controlling the electo-
rate, to strike down a statute such as MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1978) might allow corporations to dominate the electoral process in the future.
122. Further critiques of the majority's handling of these issues can be found in Justice
White's dissent in Belloi, 435 U.S. at 804-22.
123. 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
124. 407 U.S. 442-50.
125. Id at 442-43.
126. Id at 443.
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representative 127
In contrast to his opinion in Bellotti, in his Pipeftters' dissent Jus-
tice Powell never mentioned the word "corruption" but referred to "in-
fluence,"1 28 "major participation,"' 29 and the "consequences"130 and
"effect"'13 1 of the decision upon political life in the country. In P e.fit-
ters the Justice was alarmed by the increased political power which
would accrue to "the largest aggregations of economic power," 32 but
saw no need for a "record or legislative findings"'133 or a "showing" '134
that union money was influencing the political process. Furthermore,
Powell did not express any concern about how restrictions on campaign
spending might limit the rights of hearers to become informed.
Six years later Justice Powell's reluctance to overturn "numerous
legislative and judicial actions. . . designed to assure that elections are
indeed free and representative"' 35 had diminished considerably. Direct
corporate expenditures (in contrast to voluntary contributions from
shareholders and management) were not legal only if a state so chose,
but a state could not prohibit this political participation unless it could
meet the rigorous standard of showing electoral domination by corpo-
rations.' 36 Even a showing of electoral domination would merely
127. Id at 450 (emphasis added). Others have discussed the inconsistency between Jus-
tice Powell's Bellotti and ~peftters opinions, including Brudney, Business Corporations and
Stockholders' Rights under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 242 (1981), and Miller,
On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment. A Commentary on First National Bank v.
Bellotti, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 21, 22-23. Both consider Justice Powell's pro-business
views as expressed shortly before he was appointed to the Court to be the most sensible way
to reconcile Justice Powell's ~p otters and Bellotti opinions. These views of the Justice are
most clearly expressed in Confidential Memorandum: Attack on the American Free Enterprise
System, WASH. REP., Supp., Vol. 12, no. 24, Aug. 23, 1971, an article written for the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. In this article Powell states: "Business must learn the lesson, long
ago learned by labor and other self-interest groups. This is the lesson that political power is
necessary, that such power must be assiduously cultivated, and that when necessary, it must
be used aggressively and with determination-without embarrassment and without the re-
luctance which has been so characteristic of American business." Id The hard-hitting mem-
orandum also describes Ralph Nader as openly seeking destruction of the American free
enterprise system and calls for the Chamber to "evaluate social science textbooks" with the
object of "restoring the balance essential to genuine academic freedom."
128. 407 U.S. at 443, 449.
129. Id at 443.
130. Id at 448.
131. Id at 442.
132. Id at 443.
133. 435 U.S. at 789.
134. Id
135. 407 U.S. at 450.
136. Shockley, supra note 67, discusses the difficulty of convincing the Court that corpo-
rations are in fact dominating the process.
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"merit our consideration."13 7 Proving influence would likely not be
enough: "To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome
of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may
persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it.'
' 38
Why such a dramatic change? Justice Powell would perhaps say
that Bellotti dealt only with ballot propositions, which do not involve
the same kind of corruption as candidate races. But his concern in
PJ efitters was with influence and power, not the narrow quidpro quo
concept of corruption that he used in Bellotti.139 Furthermore, the cor-
porations in Belloti made no claim that their political expenses came
from voluntary contributions. These facts raise the issue of what ideo-
logical currents run underneath the explicit logic of the Supreme
Court's campaign finance reform decisions. Does wealth (but not labor
union wealth?) have certain prerogatives in society? Do the interests of
the wealthy need greater protection and greater deference than ordi-
nary citizens' needs? Analysis of Bellotti and Buckley indicates that the
Court is implicitly imposing what they perceive to be a free market
capitalist First Amendment upon the rest of the polity.
137. 435 U.S. at 789.
138. 435 U.S. at 790.
139. The importance of the distinction between ballot propositions and candidate races
was a subject of debate in Belloti, with White fearing that "[i]f the corporate identity of the
speaker makes no difference, all the Court has done is to reserve the formal interment of the
Corrupt Practices Act and similar state statutes for another day." 435 U.S. at 821.
If the test is "the inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public," id at 777, then the distinction between candidates and propositions should be irrel-
evant. In the five years since the decision, the Court has not extended its rationale to candi-
date elections. Moreover, in FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, (1982) a
unanimous Court distinguished candidate from referendum elections, and concluded that
regulations on candidates can be more drastic because "unlike in referenda on issues of
general public interest, there may well be a threat of real or apparent corruption." Id at
560-61 n.7.
The Court has also distinguished corporate spending from union spending, allowing
direct corporate spending without provisions to accommodate shareholders who oppose the
political causes supported by the corporation, see Belloit, 435 U.S. at 792-95 (1978), but
prohibiting unions from requiring contributions from employees for the support of candi-
dates or issues with which those employees disagree. See Abood v. Board of Educ., 431 U.S.
209 (1977). While Justice Powell might distinguish PLpeftiers from Bellotti on similar
grounds, his dissent consistently linked union and corporate funds together, charging that
both were inimical to the democratic process. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
David Ratner has discussed the Court's different treatment of corporate and union cam-
paign funds, comparing Bellott with Abood. Ratner, Corporations and the Constitution, 15
U.S.F. L. REv. 11, 25 (1981).
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D. Recent Inconsistencies and Continued Insensitivities
In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (CARC) ,140 the
Burger Court further developed ideas from its previous campaign fi-
nance reform cases, although not without some awkward inconsisten-
cies and departures from those decisions. 4 ' In both Buckley and
California Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission,14 the
Court made a significant distinction between restrictions on contribu-
tions and expenditures, with expenditures receiving far more protec-
tion.'43 In CARC, the Court made no distinction between
contributions and expenditures when striking down that part of Berke-
ley's campaign finance reform act which limited the amount that could
be contributed on ballot measure campaigns.144 In response to Justice
140. 454 U.S. 290 (1981). Thorough analyses of this opinion are Lowenstein, supra note
85, at 584-602, and Nicholson, The Constitutionality of Contribution Limitations in Ballot
Measure Elections, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683, 737-42 (1981). Reviews of CAJRC here will be
selective, and will focus upon aspects of the Court's implicit and explicit reasons for striking
down the law.
141. It is significant that in two cases decided the term previous to CARC, the Court
further protected corporations from governmental restrictions on their political activity. In
Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the Court ruled that the
state of New York could not prohibit corporate advertising inserts in customer utility bills.
These inserts had extolled the benefits of nuclear energy, obviously a controversial matter of
public policy. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), the Court had struck down another New York Public Service Commission regulation
which had prohibited the promotional advertising of electricity by the public utility.
142. 454 U.S. 270 (1981). In this case the Court upheld federal limitations on contribu-
tions to multicandidate political committees.
143. The majority opinion in Buckley stated that contribution limitations entail "only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," 424
U.S. at 20-21, but that "expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on
protected freedoms of political expression and association than do limitations on financial
contributions." Id at 23. The California MedicalAss'n plurality opinion written by Justice
Marshall called contributions "speech by proxy that. . . is not the sort of political advocacy
that this Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection." 453 U.S. at
196 n.16.
144. BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE § 2.12.425 (1977). These provisions were narrowly
upheld by the California Supreme Court in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berke-
ley, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980) (4-3 decision). Berkeley's initial,
more comprehensive measure was invalidated in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Berkeley,
60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976). For a discussion of the California Supreme
Court's treatment of CARC, see Bums, Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley:
Consttutionality fLimits on Contributions in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
1001 (1981); Gaynor, Preventing Corruption in the Electoral Process: The California Supreme
Court Expands the Buckley v. ValeoAnalysir of Campaign Finance Regulation to Non-Candi-
date Elections, 3 WHITrIER L. REv. 431 (1981); and Note, State and Local Limitations on
Ballot Measure Contributions, 79 MICH. L. Rv. 1421 (1981).
Chief Justice Burger wrote in CARC that "[t]he contribution limit thus automatically
affects expenditures, and limits on expenditures operate as a direct restraint on freedom of
expression." 454 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added). This statement is inconsistent with the dis-
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White's dissent and Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, both of
which stressed the importance of this distinction in prior campaign fi-
nance cases, the Chief Justice simply noted that "references to Buckley
relate to contributions to candidates and their committees; the case
before us relates to committees favoring or opposing ballot meas-
ures. ' 145 This statement indicates that, as in Bellotti, the Court did not
believe "corruption" was possible in proposition campaigns; hence, the
distinction between contributions and expenditures was superfluous. 146
Perhaps sensitive to charges that the Supreme Court's campaign
finance reform cases were revealing a commitment to defend existing
wealth distributions and their prerogatives in American society, Burger
tried to frame the Court's decision in CA1RC to show that the Court was
actually acting to protect the rights of the non-wealthy. He stated that
under the Berkeley ordinance, "an affluent person can, acting alone,
spend without limit to advocate individual views on a ballot measure.
It is only when contributions are made in concert with one or more
others in the exercise of the right of association that they are restricted
"5147
Burger did not note that the original Berkeley ordinance restricted
both contributions and expenditures and was far more comprehensive.
The reason the current statute was modified to restrict contributions
but not expenditures was the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo!141
The city of Berkeley was trapped in a "Catch-22" situation: To effec-
tively limit the power of the affluent through expenditure restrictions
would result in the ordinance being struck down as a violation of the
First Amendment under Buckley; to selectively restrict the power of the
affluent by requiring direct expenditures over the contribution limit
opened the city to the attack that the city was showing favoritism to the
tinction drawn between contributions and expenditures. Though he ignored precedent, the
Chief Justice was at least consistent with his own position, as he dissented from this distinc-
tion in Buckley. 424 U.S. at 235 (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. 454 U.S. at 299 n.6 (emphasis in original).
Chief Justice Burger also stated that "Buckley identified a single narrow exception to
the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment." Id at 296-
97. This "single narrow exception," contributions to candidate races, nonetheless involves
the vast majority of all electoral contests in the country.
146. There is growing evidence that voters are more susceptible to domination by mon-
ied interests in ballot proposition campaigns than in partisan races, and that the undermin-
ing of voter confidence or undue influence may be occurring more systematically in
proposition campaigns than in candidate elections. For a further discussion of this point see
Magleby, infra note 180 at 300-16, and accompanying text.
147. 454 U.S. at 296.
148. Interview with Natalie West, Berkeley City Attorney, in Berkeley, California
(Spring 1982).
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rich by allowing them an alternative unavailable to less affluent indi-
viduals, and was trampling on the associational rights of the less afflu-
ent. The Court adopted this criticism of the second approach,1
49
courageously striking a blow for the non-wealthy. Apparently, there
was no way Berkeley could win as the arguments kept changing to
meet each attempted refinement of the original campaign finance re-
form act passed by the voters of the city in 1974.151
Upon examination, Burger's concern for the non-wealthy showed
again an insensitivity to the conditions of the majority of American
citizens. Since the municipal ordinance allowed contributions up to
$250 per person per measure, his concern for the non-wealthy referred
only to those who were able to give more than $250, but did not have
the necessasry funds to spend directly to cover "the cost of a single
mailing to each of the 71,088 persons registered to vote in Berkeley,
which in 1977 was $12,800," or "[t]he cost of a full-page advertisement
in a Berkeley area newspaper, the Independent Gazette," which in 1977
was $1,620. l" The Supreme Court's concern was not with the violation
of the rights of free speech and free association of the majority of indi-
viduals for whom a per person contribution of $250 to a single munici-
pal campaign would be either impossible or a considerable personal
sacrifice. The Court's concern was for those who were financially able
to contribute more than $250.152
149. 454 U.S. at 295-96.
150. Id at 296 n.5. In fact the Berkeley ordinance was not entirely clear on the distinc-
tion between a contribution and an expenditure. In oral argument (Oct. 7, 1981), City Attor-
ney Natalie West said that the distinction centered on whether the person retained control
over how the money was spent.
151. Justice White, for example, noted that the measure was "tailored to the odd mea-
surements of Buckley and Bellota. Precisely because it reflects those decisions, the ordi-
nance regulates contributions but not expenditures and does not prohibit corporate
spending. It is for that very reason perhaps that the effectiveness of the ordinance in pre-
serving the integrity of the referendum process is debatable." 454 U.S. at 303-04 (White, J.,
dissenting). Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 598-601, argues that contribution limitations with-
out expenditure limitations would nonetheless help reduce the influence of money in ballot
proposition campaigns.
152. The appellant's brief stated this point succinctly: "The right to speak implies the
right to be heard. With an electorate of tens of thousands of voters in Berkeley, a single
effort to convey one's views to the electorate on any measure requires at a minimum a sizea-
ble advertisement in a newspaper of wide circulation, a general mailing, a radio speech, or
television time. Such communications require substantial funds. A campaign sufficient to
win the attention of the voters and to express the facts, views and reasons may well require
extensive use of all these media. In today's context, to limit one's "voice" to $250 is to stifle
it." Appellant's Reply Brief, Oct. 5, 1981, at 1-2.
Granted, wealth discrimination in C1ARC was less dramatic than the $50,000 limit
struck down in Buckley. Burger was quick to squelch any idea that a higher limitation
might be constitutional: 'To place a Spartan limit-or indeed any limit-on individuals
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In a view equally insensitive to the plight of ordinary citizens,
Chief Justice Burger found unconvincing Berkeley's rationale that the
ordinance should be upheld on the ground that it furthered disclosure
of the source of funds in ballot proposition campaigns:
[Tjhere is no risk that the Berkeley voters will be in doubt as to
the identity of those whose money supports or opposes a given
ballot measure since contributors must make their identities
known under § 112 of the ordinance, which requires publication
of lists of contributors in advance of the voting.'53
Chief Justice Burger assumed that ordinary voters would go down to
the courthouse to check over the list of contributors to a municipal bal-
lot proposition, or that, under Berkeley's stricter disclosure statute, they
would read the list of contributors which must be run in local newspa-
pers. 154 Strong evidence exists, however, which shows that most voters
are not so conscientious, and that even if the one side tries to make an
issue of the sources of an opposing side's funding, many voters will not
receive the message.' 55 When disclosure is not concurrent with the ad-
vertising message, voters are unlikely to assess the credibility of the
message before their perception of the issue is established.'56 With lim-
ited and often obscure disclosure weeks or months after the advertising,
voters cannot easily evaluate the hidden agendas that may accompany
ballot proposition campaigns, nor translate the sometimes deliberately
misleading names of political committees formed in support of or in
opposition to ballot measures. 157
wishing to band together to advance their views on a ballot measure ... is clearly a re-
straint on the right of association." 454 U.S. at 296. In contrast to the argument advanced
by the appellants, Chief Justice Burger went so far as to imply that the modified law was
ineffective because it placed limits on associational rights while it "does not seek to mute the
voice of one individual." Id
153. 454 U.S. at 298.
154. Election Reform Act of 1974, Ord. No. 4700-NS, § 112.
155. Perhaps the best evidence on this point comes from a study by the Rand Corpora-
tion of the 1976 nuclear safety initiative in California. This research showed a surprising
lack of knowledge by voters on the sources and amount of campaign funds being spent. In a
post-election poll, only 37% of those who voted on the proposition knew that there was more
advertising on the "no" side. Yet the opposition had spent roughly three million dollars
more than proponents (or nearly four times as much), and supporters had tried to make this
fact a major issue in the campaign. D. HENSLER & C. HENSLER, EVALUATING NUCLEAR
POWER: VOTER CHOICE ON THE CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR ENERGY INITIATIVE 128 (1979).
156. See Nicholson, supra note 140, at 711, and Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 562-63.
157. Chief Justice Burger acknowledged in CARC that committees "often adopt seduc-
tive names that may tend to conceal the true identity of the source of funds." 454 U.S. at
298. Although not discussed in particular by the Chief Justice, Berkeley has had frustrating
examples of misleading, "seductive" names in its municipal ballot proposition campaigns.
One example, cited by Berkeley City Attorney Natalie West in oral argument before the
United States Supreme Court on Oct. 13, 1981, concerned a measure allowing for municipal
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In C4RC, the Supreme Court revealed its apparent naivete to-
wards the political process as experienced by ordinary voters, 158 and
again showed its bias towards the practices of the upper class and up-
per middle class, for whom large contributions and careful reading of
lists of contributors to campaigns may come easily.
III. The Impact of Judicial Activism
There has been considerable speculation as to the impact on
American politics of the Supreme Court's activity protecting monied
interests in the electoral process. 159 Hard evidence is difficult to de-
velop, but it is undeniable that the Court's campaign finance decisions
have affected who has won and who has lost elections, the nature of the
ownership of electric facilities for the city. A "Southwest Berkeley No No No on W Com-
mittee" was formed to oppose the measure, but all of its contributions came from one
source, Pacific Gas & Electric Company. The title was even more deceptive than it first
appears, in that Southwest Berkeley is the minority section of the city.
158. To speak to the "naivete" of the Supreme Court will strike some as unduly charita-
ble. The Court may indeed recognize the class bias of their arguments in CA4RC, as they
more likely do in their view of the "restraints" that the $50,000 limitation places on candi-
dates for federal office. Motives, however, are no more important than results, and the char-
ity of John Stuart Mill may be accurate here. See MILL, supra note 88, at 216-17.
159. See, e.g., Church, Slinging Mud and Money, TIME, Nov. 15, 1982, at 43. Of the 33
Senators elected in 1982 '"7 outspent their opponents, frequently by wide margins in close
races." Id The Church article contends that "escalating spending is undermining the polit-
ical process," because it "tends to confine political office to candidates who are either inde-
pendently wealthy or willing to sell their votes to the proliferating political action
committees (PACs) of special-interest groups." Edward Roeder, author of a directory of
PACs, is quoted as saying: "Many Senate seats have been bought but not yet paid for. We
will see whether they are put up for sale." Id
Discussing the 1982 elections, Representative Guy Vander Jagt, chairman of the Re-
publican Congressional Committee, stated that but for the Republicans' superior funding,
the GOP might have lost "40 or 50 or 60" House seats. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1982, at 34.
Likewise, Nancy Sinnott, executive director of the National Republican Congressional
Committee, commented that Republican money "preserved many seats that might have
gone down otherwise." Clymer, Campaign Funds Called a Key to Outcome of House Races,"
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 5. Clymer noted that "the Republicans ... won
just 43.7 percent [of the national vote for the House of Representatives], a percentage that
might have cost them 44 seats instead of 26 if past results proved predictive." Id at B10, col.
3.
Analysis of the results of daily polling by candidates shows that new advertisements
and different themes can make a considerable impact on voter opinion. See, e.g., L.
SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS ch. 6 (1981); Dionne, The Voters Make
Some Pollsters Losers Too, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1982, at E4; Blumenthal, Media and Illu-
sion, WORKING PAPERS MAGAZINE, July/Aug., 1982, at 46, 49-50. While much evidence of
this sort exists, it is generally available only to those who conducted the polls, generally
wealthy candidates, thereby further perpetuating a monied bias in campaign techniques and
sophistication.
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campaign process, and public policy.' 60 A series of complementary
trends, including the decline of partisan identification and increasingly
sophisticated campaign techniques, indicates that money is becoming
more important in our political process.16 1 Both campaign laws and the
judicial response to these laws are premised on the idea that money
makes a difference in the electoral and governing process. If money
was not seen as important to political campaigns and government,
there would be little need for regulation, and little controversy on the
subject.' 62 Rather than engage in a review of the best attempts at meth-
odological techniques for isolating the specific role of money in poli-
tics,' 63 this Article will note the multifaceted ways in which money
160. Observers have noted that political consultants and pollsters are an enormous
"growth industry" as campaigns have become increasingly expensive. See, e.g., SABATO,
supra note 159 at ch. 3, and Drew, Money and Politics, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 6, 1982, at
54-149, and Dec. 13, 1982, at 57-111. This is just what some have feared. See, e.g., Wright,
supra note 38, at 620-22. Numerous commentators have speculated on the impact escalating
contributions are having on public policy. See, e.g., Green, Political PA C-MAIN, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 1982, at 18; Osborne, Can This Party Be Saved?, WORKING PAPERS
MAGAZINE, July/Aug., 1982, at 36. A main difficulty is assessing causation. What Alexan-
der heard said over twenty years ago is still true: [There is] [n]o neat correlation ... be-
tween campaign expenditures and campaign results. Even if superiority in expenditures and
success at the polls always ran together, the flow of funds. . . might simply reflect. . . prior
popular appeal rather than create it. Our understanding of voting behavior is not so precise
that all the financial and non-financial factors that contribute to success can be sorted out
with confidence. Yet it is clear that under some conditions the use of funds can be decisive.
And under others no amount of money spent.., could alter the outcome. . . . A. HEARD,
THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 16 (1960).
Debate rages over the extent to which special interest groups are literally "buying"
favors or whether they are giving to politicians who already support their views and would
support them regardless of their expenditures. While both undoubtedly occur, Drew offers
some dramatic examples of the influencing of public policy through contributions. Drew,
supra at 80-92, 131-34. To the extent that Drew and others of like view are correct, the
Supreme Court in Buckley was wrong in asserting that expenditure limits are superfluous for
preventing corruption as long as contribution limits exist. With the proliferation of PACs
and other forms of giving, candidates can become increasingly indebted to monied interests
even as contribution limits are retained. See Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 597 n.347.
161. See Wright, supra note 38, at 620-21, and Adamany, PA C's and the Democratic Fi-
nancing of Politics, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 569 (1968).
162. While this point may appear obvious, it has occasionally given the judiciary trouble.
The Supreme Court has reasoned that money is not dominating the electoral process, but is
so important its use must be protected. See supra Part II. When the government has spent
sums on ballot propositions, opponents, even if wealthy, have been known suddenly to argue
that the government expenditure will cause them "irreparable harm." See, e.g., Mountain
States Legal Found. v. Denver School Dist. 459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978). See generally
Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93
HARV. L. REv. 535 (1980) (discussion of the issues involved in government spending on
ballot propositions).
163. Professor Gary Jacobson has developed a sophisticated method of isolating the im-
pact of money in campaigns by assessing the differential impact of partisanship, incum-
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influences our electoral campaigns, and suggest ways in which future
research might better document its impact.
The perception that money "buys" elections influences our polity.
It frustrates many people without adequate resources in their attempts
at running for office. 1"' In addition to those who cite money as a rea-
son for dropping out of a campaign, undoubtedly far more never enter
a race because of their obvious financial weaknesses. The number of
voters who have dropped out of the system or never become involved,
because of what they see as a deck stacked in favor of the rich, is
equally significant.'65 Furthermore, startling examples of victories by
unknown or little-known candidates with strong financial backing sug-
gest that money can be decisive in political campaigns. 166
bency, and money. G. JACOBSON, supra note 79. He has found money to make a difference,
although it has seemed far more helpful to challengers than to incumbents. Id at clis. 2, 5.
The method by which he implements his two-stage least squares simultaneous equation
model has been called into question by Welch, Money and Votes: Simultaneous Equation
Model, 36 PUB. CHOICE 209 (1981).
164. Although many known examples of this exist, two will suffice: "I'll tell you some-
thing has to be done," said State Senator Peyton McKnight, a millionaire Texan who
dropped out of the 1982 gubernatorial primary election because campaigning was too expen-
sive. "You've got to be immensely wealthy to run for office. There's something wrong when
anybody can't run for office and there are fewer and fewer people voting. I don't know what
the answer is." The Texas Observer, Sept. 17; 1982, at 14. An older story makes the same
point: "After the last dollar was spent in Oklahoma's Democratic senatorial primary, U.S.
Senator Robert Kerr turned in a report of his personal campaign expenses to the state elec-
tion board. The amount: $2,675. The Board was awaiting a report from former Governor
Roy Turner, who ran some 30,000 votes behind Kerr. . .but Oklahomans knew that his
total would be no more than $3,000, because state law limits individual campaign expenses
to that amount. Actually, Oklahoma observers estimated that about $1,000,000 was spent in
Kerr's campaign.. .The campaign of Turner. ..cost about halfa million. When Turner
started telephoning his friends last week to talk about the forthcoming runoff primary, he
found his outside financial sources pretty well dried up. Furious, he charged that "deluges
of money" had been spent to defeat him, and that "pressure" had prevented many of his
friends from advancing more funds. The same day, Turner announced his withdrawal from
the runoff, virtually handing the Senate seat to Kerr. . Roy Turner, only a millionaire, had
decided that he could not match campaign dollars with multimillionaire Bob Kerr. TIME,
July 26, 1954, at 15, quoted in Newman, Money and Elections Law in Britain-Guide/or
America? 10 W. POL. Q. 582 (1957).
165. Apparently, there have not been any studies on this point, although some have ex-
amined the motives of non-voters. See, e.g., W. CROTTY & G. JACOBSON, AMERICAN PAR-
TIES IN DECLINE 22-25 (1980). An obvious difficulty in conducting such a study is isolating
the money factor from other sources of alienation and estrangement.
166. See, e.g., Spiegel, Surprise Showing by GOP Candidate Probed, L.A. Times, Aug. 19,
1982, at II, 1, col. 1. In this case an unemployed, sick, and unknown GOP candidate nar-
rowly lost the primary; her near upset victory undoubtedly occurred because $40,000 was
mysteriously funneled into her race shortly before the election. Primary elections are partic-
ularly susceptible to the power of money because partisanship is not a factor and multi-
candidate races leave many voters uninformed and undecided.
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Public financing of political races in the United States, albeit of
limited extent, also illustrates the significance of money in politics. In
general, more candidates enter these races.' 67  Of course, races with
numerous candidates crowding the ballot may not be desirable because
many candidates might lead to voter confusion or disillusionment.
Even so, one must ask whether the appropriate screening procedures
for candidates should be wealth or some procedure more in concert
with the stated ideals of a democracy, such as voter support indicated
by a candidate collecting a minimum number of signatures16 8 or at-
tracting broad financial support through modest contributions.
With the increase in spending for federal offices has come heavy
personal spending by wealthy candidates,1 69 which may be responsible
for the record number of millionaires in the Senate. 7 " The growth of
independent spending, including negative independent spending, 17 I at-
tests to the considerable use of practices that would have been outlawed
except for the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley 1. Valeo.
The precise impact of these influences is difficult to measure be-
cause it varies with other factors which also influence the electoral pro-
cess. It is likely, however, that campaign finance laws, such as public
financing, were decisive in the election of some candidates, 72 and that
the Court's invalidation of campaign finance reform measures resulted
167. The large field entering the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial race, which was waged
with public financing of the primary as well as general election, is indicative of this trend.
Large Primary Fieldfor New Jersey Governor, CONG. Q., May 16, 1981, at 861; Must New
Jersey Pay the Pper Because It Pays the Candidates?, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1981, at E 6, col.
4. Although the low threshold to qualify for funds was criticized, it contrasts with and hence
highlights the barrier money normally erects in our political process.
168. For further discussion on this point, see Fleishman, supra note 14, at 349-50.
169. For accounts of pressure to spend personal resources on campaigns, see Firmage &
Christensen, supra note 84, at 210-12. For the increase in personal spending, see Chevigny,
supra note 11, at 211, and Crotty & Jacobson, supra note 165, at ch. 6.
170. CROTTY & JACOBSON, supra note 165, at 107. Note that by 1978 over 40% of all
United States senators were millionaires. The figure has increased from both the 1980 and
1982 elections. Of course inflation might partially account for the increase in millionaires.
171. For works on the growth of independent spending and negative independent spend-
ing, see Nesbit, supra note 2, and Bannon, NCPA4C in the 80"s: Action v. Reaction, 4 CAM-
PAIGNS & ELECTIONS 36 (Winter 1983).
172. A number of scholars think that Jimmy Carter's capture of the Democratic party
nomination and his victory against President Ford in 1976 were facilitated by the new laws
governing public financing of presidential elections. See, e.g., Abrams & Settle, Economic
Analysis ofFederal Election Campaign Regulation, 2 RESEARCH IN L Aw & ECONOMICS 129
(1980), and Alexander, "Equal Time" Election Reform: A Mixed Blessing, 1 CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS 9 (Fall 1980).
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in the election of other candidates. 173
Evidence from congressional races indicates that money spent by
challengers is more important than money spent by incumbents.174
With this evidence in mind, scholars are divided over what is the best
method of limiting the impact of money in politics. Some suggest gov-
emiment funding floors: government funds would provide candidates a
minimum level of finances high enough to insure a credible cam-
paign. 175 Others promote ceilings on funding: contributions or expend-
itures above a certain amount would be prohibited, as in the ill-fated
1974 act.' 76  In part, this disagreement comes from a dispute over
whether too much is being spent on campaigns, or too little.17 7 Appar-
ently no scholars, however, are comfortable with present government
regulations, or lack thereof, and the impact money is now having on
our political process. 78
It appears that money is an even greater factor in ballot proposi-
tions than in candidate elections, although success is heavily tied to the
money being spent in opposition to measures rather than in support. 179
When voting on a ballot proposition, one does not have the orienting
devices of party labels or candidate names to serve as anchors.1 80 In
addition, because some issues present problems of great complexity, the
electorate sometimes votes against something for which they actually
173. Jacobson believes that the 1974 expenditure limits on congressional races would
have prevented several wealthy challengers from winning office. JACOBSON, supra note 79,
at 209-14.
174. See id at chs. 2, 5.
175. See, e.g., SABATO, supra note 159, at 330-37; Alexander, supra note 172, at 12 and
Ranney, Regulating the Referendum, THE REFERENDUM DEViCE ch. 5 (A. Ranney ed. 1981).
176. The Supreme Court's decisions in Buckley, Bellotti and CARC have made this alter-
native unfeasible. It is interesting to note that those advocating floors feared that ceilings set
too low would prevent challengers from mounting credible campaigns, and that the reforms
would become an "incumbent protection" act. See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 79, at ch. 7.
177. See, e.g., SABATO, supra note 159, at 330-37. Alexander, has noted that: "Rela-
tively, the dollar price of U.S. elections is not high. The $540 million spent on campaigns in
1976 was less than the total of the advertising budgets for that year of the two largest corpo-
rate advertisers, Proctor & Gamble and General Motors." Alexander, supra note 172, at 19.
178. After discussing more comprehensive campaign finance regulations, Chevigny com-
ments, "It may be that we would all end up despising such a system of regulation as an
administrative nightmare. Yet we must confront the proposal fully, because the present
system is arguably even more objectionable." Chevigny, supra note 11, at 226. See also
Ehrenhalt, The Campaign System No One AskedFor, CONG. Q., Oct. 16, 1982, at 2703, and
Darr & Tifft, supra note 93.
179. See Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 544-47, and Shockley, The Initiative Process in
Colorado Politics: An Assessment 20-33, 39-48 (1980) (monograph).
180. For discussion on this point, see Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot
Propositions in the United States, ch. 7 and Appendix C (1980) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley) and Shockley, supra note 179 at 48.
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approve;1 81 this possibility of confusion likely increases the use of
deception.
The disparity in spending between sides on ballot propositions is
often much greater than in candidate races 82 for two reasons. First,
most propositions do not generate party support. Second, the Supreme
Court in Bellotti upheld the right of anyone, including corporations,
unions, and trade associations, to spend unlimited amounts on ballot
issues. In supporting candidates one must work through voluntary
contributions to PACs' 83 of limited amounts.' 8 4 Consequently, some of
the most extreme examples of monied interests overwhelming less
wealthy foes have occurred in ballot proposition campaigns. 185
The importance of this rapidly accumulating evidence is itself
open to dispute because it is unclear how receptive the Supreme Court
will be to newly generated empirical evidence.' 86 Perhaps if studies
focused on the Court's unexamined empirical assumptions, contrary
evidence would lead the Court to alter its campaign finance decisions.
Competent research designs will not be easy to construct. Simple cor-
relation does not necessarily mean causation, and assessing the relative
importance of money is no easy task. 187 Vagueness by the Court on
what are permissible and impermissible roles for money in the electoral
process has left scholars with uncertain guidelines for research.
An area that undoubtedly is worth examining is the assumption in
Buckley that "a restriction on the amount of money a person or group
can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
181. Magleby discusses voter confusion on the tax measure that resulted in the Bellotti
case, noting that lower-income and less-educated voters were more likely to vote against
their stated preferences. Magleby, supra note 180, at ch. 5. Hensler and Hensler have also
examined voter confusion over whether a vote in favor of a proposition means to support an
issue or to oppose it. HENSLER & HENSLER, supra note 155, at § V.
182. See Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 589.
183. For discussion on how the Bellotti decision allows corporations to overcome the
"free rider" problem inherent in voluntary organizations, see Patton & Bartlett, supra note
27, at 507-08; Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 572-78.
184. Individuals and unincorporated associations are limited in the amount that they can
contribute to a PAC. See Richards, In Search of a Consensus on the Future of Campaign
Finance Laws.- California Medical Assoc. v. FEC, 20 AMER. Bus. L.J. 243 (1982).
185. See Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 609-32, and Shockley, supra note 179, at 20-33.
186. Compare L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 58-59 (SuPP. 1979) with Ki-
ley, supra note 101, at 429 n.l1.
187. Organizations are often eager to claim that their activity or contributions were "re-
sponsible" for a particular outcome. For more on the difficulty of analyzing the impact of
money on an election, see supra note 163, and Shockley, supra note 67.
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reached."' 88 With multi-million dollar campaigns routinely pouring
money into spot announcements of such quality as "They're at it again!
Vote NO on 5,"189 this untested assumption is open to question. If the
First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is es-
sential to the welfare of the public,"'19 one may validly question
whether this goal is furthered by allowing wealthy individuals and cor-
porations the judicially-created loopholes they now enjoy.
Working against amassing evidence on these unsupported judicial
conclusions is the belief by some that the Court's use of empirical evi-
dence has been so inconsistent as to indicate that data is used to ration-
alize conclusions rather than to influence results.191 If this is true, only
changes in judicial personnel, or different avenues to reform, will possi-
bly effect major changes in the use of money in political campaigns.
IV. Alternative Routes to Reform
This section will attempt to explore the alternatives that might be
pursued by those sharing the goals of the original campaign finance
reformers. These reformers viewed their efforts to curb the impact of
money in elections as a natural outgrowth of the broader effort to
widen access to the political process, create greater political equality,
and secure the sanctity of the ballot. 192 Such goals will not be easy to
implement, 93 but it is important to remember that the Court never
closed off all avenues to reform. The following alternatives are still
open: public funding of political campaigns, which could include the
development of floors rather than ceilings; changes in the franking
privilege to benefit non-incumbents; government funding of television
time; and the prohibition of paid political advertising on television and
radio. 19 If banning paid political advertising is held to be unconstitu-
tional, expansion of the "fairness doctrine"' 95 and the Cullman corol-
188. 424 U.S. at 108-09 (emphasis added). Among others, Leventhal, supra note 50, has
attacked this unsupported assumption.
189. See Lowenstein, supra note 85, at 585 n.292.
190. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (emphasis added).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 49-158.
192. Eg., Rosenthal, supra note 26, at 360-61.
193. See JOHNSTON, supra note 77, at 149.
194. See Wright, supra note 38, at 642-44; and Lembke, A Bipartisan Pushfor Some Cam-
paign Finance Refrms, CAL. ST. B. 155 (Apr. 1983). Green has discussed other ideas being
considered in the wake of the 1982 elections. Green, supra note 160, at 24-25.
195. The "fairness doctrine" as developed by the Federal Communications Commission
basically requires that broadcasters (1) devote a reasonable percentage of time to the cover-
age of public issues and (2) that this coverage must be fair in providing an opportunity for
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lary' 96 to benefit the less wealthy could be pursued.1 97  Another
alternative is the development of disclosure laws aimed at reaching
more voters, and providing information before the advertising has ef-
fectively shaped voters' perceptions of contests. Oregon's recent ap-
proach of permitting false advertising lawsuits in campaigns, with
potentially meaningful damage claims, should be closely followed and
perhaps implemented elsewhere.' 98 Finally, greater shareholder de-
mocracy should be pursued so that corporate spending might be better
controlled and more widely disclosed.' 99
None of the reforms suggested would be a panacea. The complex-
ities of fair standards and effective implementation on a subject as sen-
sitive and important as the role of money in politics requires a "trial
and error" approach. Each reform adopted could lead to unforeseen
consequences which might affect the nature and outcome of election
campaigns. Nevertheless, not to act is to acquiesce in the regularly at-
tempted and sometimes successful buying of elections and public pol-
icy by those whose greater financial resources can dominate and
overwhelm the political process. °°
Conclusion
None of these alternatives suggested will be easy to adopt. Mon-
ied interests will likely fight these proposals; regulatory agencies, such
as the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities and
Exchange Commission, whose support may be necessary for imple-
mentation, have shown little sympathy, and sometimes outright hostil-
the presentation of contrasting points of view. See Fairness Report. 48 F.C.C.2d 1-2, 30
R.R.2d 1261 (1974).
196. The Cullman principle, also discussed in the Fairness Report, states that ballot pro-
positions are to be considered closer to general political discussion not involving elections of
individuals to office, and that licensees are required to present contrasting views, even by
granting free time to a side without money if necessary. Id, at 31-33, 30 R.R.2d at 1302.
197. See Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the
Referendum Process Through Media Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED. COM. L.J.
315 (1980).
198. See OR. REv. STAT. § 260.532 (1979). Shockley, supra note 67, at 27, discusses this
approach in more detail. There are obvious difficulties with this route to reform, the most
apparent perhaps being that courts are reluctant to find false advertising by candidates. The
worst abuses may often be deception rather than outright lies. For examples of the difficul-
ties, see Committee to Retain Judge Jacob Tenyer v. Lee, 270 Or. 215, 527 P.2d 247 (1974),
and Kennedy v. Voss, 304 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1981).
199. See Brudney, supra note 127.
200. Even when financial resources are not mobilized, the knowledge that funding can
enter the process surely affects campaign strategies and public policy. See supra note 160.
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ity, to the goals of campaign finance reform. 01 When the difficulty of
achieving campaign reform is viewed in light of the Supreme Court's
development of a free market capitalist First Amendment, the ines-
capable conclusion is that money will continue to exercise considerable
influence in our politics. Campaign finance reform involves higher
stakes and is more complex than many of the other political process
issues which have arisen in American society to foster greater democ-
racy. In becoming a "stepchild" of this broader reform movement,
campaign finance reform has exposed tensions between the ideas and
practices of democracy and capitalism. On what terms these forces are
ultimately compatible remains to be seen.
201. For a discussion of the FCC's lack of sympathy, see F. Heffron, The Politics of
Deregulation (unpublished paper presented at the Western Political Science Association
Conference, Denver, Colorado 1981). An example of dominant opinion within the current
SEC is the Commission's 1982 decision overruling an SEC staff report which sought to re-
quire corporations which were guilty of breaking laws of foreign nations to disclose the
wrongdoings to their shareholders. See NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 1982, at 61. If the SEC rules
that even criminal behavior can be kept secret from shareholders, it is difficult to imagine
the SEC requiring Corporations to report campaign expenditures to their shareholders.

